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THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
EDWARD L. RUBIN* 
Abstract: Because federalism grants partial autonomy to subunits of a nation, 
it has potentially broad implications for the prevailing system of international 
law, which is centered around the integrity of nation states. Military interven-
tion in the internal affairs of a nation to protect human rights or combat terror-
ist activity might be regarded as more justifiable if the people being protected 
are members of a federalized subunit. Alternatively, foreign nations may feel 
more justified in establishing trade or cultural relations with a subunit of a na-
tion, over objections by the nation’s government, if the subunit has federalized 
status. In other words, federalism can be viewed as modifying the principle of 
national sovereignty. This important possibility is largely unexplored in the in-
ternational law literature. In recent years, a great deal of attention has been 
devoted to the implications of American federalism for the treaty powers of 
our national government and for the foreign relations powers of the state gov-
ernments. While these questions refer to international law, they are basically 
domestic law inquiries about the relationship between state and national gov-
ernment. This article, in contrast, deals directly with federalism’s implications 
for relations between different nations. On the basis of a theory that treats fed-
eralism as a sub-optimal compromise for dealing with conflicts of political 
identity, the article concludes that federalism does not justify increased levels 
of intervention, nor does it permit foreign nations to establish relations with 
subunits in violation of national policy. But the article does recognize an im-
portant role for federalism in international relations. One nation should not in-
tervene by force in another nation unless it has some reason to believe its in-
tervention can be effective in solving the problem that provided the basis for 
the intervention. In a number of cases, federalism may be such a solution. In 
addition, while nations should not establish trade or cultural relations with 
subunits in violation of national policy, federalism creates a presumption that 
certain relations are acceptable to the national government, and thus requires 
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the national government of a federal regime to be more explicit in prohibiting 
such relations than the government of a unitary regime would need to be. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the seventeenth century, international relations in the West-
ern World have been structured as interactions among separate sovereign 
entities, an approach generally known as the Westphalian system.1 This 
model, which served as the basis for the United Nations (U.N.), was ex-
tended after World War II to the entire world. But the model seems to con-
flict with federalism, a subject of continued and perhaps increasing interest 
in the modern scholarship of government. Federalism challenges the con-
cept of a nation as a single entity by granting various forms of autonomy to 
subunits within the nation. The question then arises whether it provides a 
justification for one nation to ignore or violate the wishes of another na-
tion’s central government and intervene in that nation’s affairs, either by 
force or through contract with a federalized subunit. 
The debate has acquired increased significance as a result of two re-
cent developments, one legal and the other factual, that establish normative 
grounds for intervention. The legal development is the incorporation of the 
so-called Right to Protect, or R2P provisions, in the United Nations’ World 
Summit Outcome Document, adopted by the General Assembly in 2005.2 
Strongly supported by the African Union, various Latin American nations, 
and Canada,3 the Document states, inter alia, that the signatories “are pre-
pared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national au-
thorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 For the classic statement of this principle, see EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
(Knud Haakonssen ed., 2008) (originally published in 1758). For a discussion of the modern doc-
trine, see Charles R. Beitz, Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs, in POLITICAL THE-
ORY TODAY 236, 236–54 (David Held ed., 1991); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 46–
59 (2d ed. 2005); James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPAN-
ION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 117–33 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); 
ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 14–22, 266–79 
(Paul Wilkinson ed., 1986); and MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409–14 (6th ed. 
2008). 
 2 See G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–139 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 
World Summit Outcome]. For an account of its adoption, see GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 31–54 (2008). For dis-
cussions, see EVANS, supra; and THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 97–132 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 3 Not the United States, however. John Bolton, the U.S Ambassador to the United Nations at 
the time, attempted to delay or derail the process. See EVANS, supra note 2, at 47; Brian Urquhart, 
One Angry Man, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/03/06/
one-angry-man/?printpage=true [https://perma.cc/7FPH-WNHF].  
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war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”4 The U.N. Se-
curity Council expressly reaffirmed these provisions the following year,5 
and the Secretary General issued a report on their implementation in 2009.6 
While the primary effect of the World Summit Outcome remains aspiration-
al, it represents a developing norm that interventions into the affairs of sov-
ereign nations are justified under certain circumstances.7 
The factual development is the rapid rise of international terrorism.8 
Nations that have been attacked by terrorists headquartered in another na-
tion can argue that this other nation has, in effect, attacked them directly by 
tolerating or supporting the terrorist organization. They can thus claim justi-
fication for a variety of interventions, often grouped under the general head-
ing of counterinsurgency, that range from sanctions, to interdiction of the 
terrorists within the other nation’s borders, to outright invasion and regime 
change of that other nation.9 
In recent years, a great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to 
a topic that is often described as the role of federalism in international rela-
                                                                                                                           
 4 World Summit Outcome, supra note 2, ¶ 139. 
 5 See S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006) (“Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”). 
 6 See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“The present report responds to one of the cardinal challenges of our 
time, as posed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: operationalizing 
the responsibility to protect . . . .”). 
 7 For academic support for the World Summit Outcome, see infra note 65. 
 8 See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the origins 
of modern terrorism and the motivations of particular terrorist groups); MARK JUERGENSMEYER, 
TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (3d ed. 2003) (com-
paring various religious traditions' justifications for violence); Ariel Merari, The Readiness to Kill 
and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGY, IDEO-
LOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 192, 192–207 (Walter Reich ed., 1998) (describing the 
psychology of terrorists and their general attitude toward human life); BRIGITTE L. NACOS, TER-
RORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THREATS AND RESPONSES IN THE POST–
9/11 WORLD (2d ed. 2008) (analyzing the varying motivations for terrorists in the United States 
and in other nations); JOBY WARRICK, BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS (2015) (discussing the 
rapid emergence of ISIS after the U.S. invasion of Iraq following Sept. 11, 2001). 
 9 See DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF COERCION: AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT 48–86, 132–34 (2002); SETH G. JONES, 
WAGING INSURGENT WARFARE: LESSONS FROM THE VIETCONG TO THE ISLAMIC STATE 9, 176–
203 (2017); DAVID J. KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1–2 (2010); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE 
COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE AGE OF SMALL WARS 5–20 (2013); Karl W. 
Eikenberry, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 59, 66, 
69 (2013). Conflicts of this sort are often viewed as a new development. But see JOHN A. NAGL, 
LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE: COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA TO 
VIETNAM (2005) (discussing the British conflict in Malaysia from 1948 to 1957 as well as U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam); DOUGLAS PORCH, COUNTERINSURGENCY: EXPOSING THE MYTHS OF 
THE NEW WAY OF WAR 145–52, 175–79, 268–88 (2013) (describing earlier counterinsurgency 
conflicts such as Algeria, Palestine, and Northern Ireland). 
198 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:195 
tions. A good deal of this literature addresses the question of whether the 
subunits of a federal nation or quasi-federal nation, particularly the United 
States, should be able to maintain relations of one sort or another with other 
nations.10 Another theme is whether certain international agreements by the 
national government infringe American state sovereignty by delegating de-
cision making authority to international institutions.11 These are interesting 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: 
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016) (arguing that the extensive role American states 
and cities play in international relations should be recognized as a basic feature of the governmen-
tal structure of the United States); Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the 
New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1221 (2008) (describing 
“intersystemic governance” as a theory of dual federalism that accounts for the growing independ-
ent voices of states and localities in the international arena while recognizing that this trend “in-
volves no displacement of national voice”); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitution-
al Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
245 (2001) (examining state and local attempts to “adopt” international human rights norms and 
treaties and arguing for a new analytical model that balances national and state/local sovereignty 
claims in the context of international human rights obligations); Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying 
Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Govern-
ment Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008) (investigating the expanding role of translocal 
organizations of government actors (TOGAs) in shaping law and policy in the context of climate 
change and arguing for according TOGAs “special forms of legal status”); Edward T. Swaine, 
Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 
(2000) (arguing that the Treaty Clause, enforced through the dormant treaty power, precludes 
states from bargaining with foreign nations, but permits incidental effects and presidential excep-
tions). Other works challenge the conventional view that the national government possesses exclu-
sive authority over foreign relations in a federal system. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal 
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997) (observing that the U.S. 
constitutional system does not grant the national government exclusive authority over internation-
al relations and that it would not be possible to do so); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Af-
fairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal 
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007) (exploring “translocal transnationalism” and judicial 
and congressional responses to its growth); Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Gov-
ernance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115 (2007) (advocating for a 
“polyphonic” understanding of federalism and applying it to the transnational and domestic con-
texts). 
 11 See, e.g., Enid F. Beaumont, Domestic Consequences of Internationalization, in GLOBALI-
ZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS, POLICY ISSUES, AND INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 374, 374–86 (Jong S. Jun & Deil S. 
Wright eds., 1996) (describing the effects of globalization and international trade agreements on 
federal arrangements); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 66–79 (1998) (arguing 
that global governance conflicts with federalism); George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implica-
tions of U.S. Participation in Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463 (1998) (observing that 
international agreements that grant authority to institutions with ongoing decision making authori-
ty can impose requirements in matters allocated to state authority); Curtis A. Bradley, Internation-
al Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 
(2003) (arguing that international treaties enable the federal government to increase its range of 
authority over the states); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004) (observing that international agreements that grant authority to 
international institutions may interfere with some aspects of federalism, but serve a similar pur-
pose by diffusing power); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. 
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and important questions for any nation, and particularly for federalized 
ones, but most of the discussion relates to the internal organization of a na-
tion, that is, to domestic law, not to international law. If the nation’s domes-
tic law permits contacts between its subunits and foreign nations, there is 
really no international law question worth discussing. It goes without saying 
that a foreign nation can engage in the permitted contacts; no principle of 
international law forbids contacts with a nation that the nation itself has au-
thorized.12 The international law question is whether one nation is allowed 
to intervene in the affairs of another nation against that second nation’s will, 
either by force or through agreements with subunits of that second nation. 
This subject seems to be rarely discussed in the existing literature.13 It is the 
topic that this article will address. 
The basic argument is that the federalized structure of a nation does 
not provide a separate ground for intervention. That is, the fact that a nation 
has granted autonomy rights to one or more of its subunits should not be 
seen as justifying intervention that would otherwise be unjustified. But fed-
                                                                                                                           
INT’L L.J. 527, 537 (2003) (arguing that international agreements that grant authority to institu-
tions with ongoing decision making authority can undermine American federalism). 
 12 It is difficult to prove a negative, but I have been unable to find any discussion of federal-
ism in a number of the major contemporary monographs and collections by international law and 
relations scholars discussing intervention. The term “federalism” and its cognates is absent from 
the alphabetical place in the indices of these works where it would appear if it had been included. 
E.g., BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 317 
(Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995); EVANS, supra note 2, at 335; K. M. FIERKE, 
DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTIONS: CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 218 (2005); 
STEPHEN A. GARRETT, DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL: AN EXAMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 208–09 (1999); AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUC-
TION 296 (2d ed. 2013); ERIC A. HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW, 
AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 199–200 (2009); HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 219 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004); HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 340 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Keohane eds., 2003); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 301 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams 
eds., 2006); INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 197 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984); KILCULLEN, supra 
note 9, at 242;  FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT? THE PARADOX OF HUMANITARIAN AC-
TION 278 (2002); SAMUEL TOTTEN, THE PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION OF GENOCIDE: AN 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1136 (2007); WEISS, supra note 2, at 189; NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, 
SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 324 (2000); 
HIKARU YAMASHITA, HUMANITARIAN SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CREATION OF 
SAFE AREAS 210 (2004). 
 13 This same distinction applies to alliances such as the European Union that place limits on 
certain international contacts by the members of the alliance. Again, if the alliance allows con-
tacts, there is no international law question; if it does not, then the international law question is 
whether a foreign nation is entitled to violate the terms of the alliance. See Paul Schiff Berman, 
Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2007) (arguing for a “jurisgenerative” 
theory of the global legal environment that accounts for the interplay of multiple normative actors, 
communities, and commitments). See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Federalism and the European 
Union: A Constitutional Perspective, 90 PUB. CHOICE 255 (1997) (examining the structure, deci-
sion-making process, and goals of the European Union from a constitutional perspective). 
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eralism should be treated as a potential remedy once intervention is deemed 
justifiable on some other ground. To the extent that the decision to intervene 
depends, as it often should, on the availability of a practicable remedy, the 
possibility of granting some subunit autonomy rights might thus be regard-
ed as a ground for intervention that might otherwise be deemed inadvisable. 
In addition, the federalized structure of a nation can be viewed as creating a 
presumption that certain trade and cultural relations with that nation’s subu-
nits are authorized, a presumption that the central government would need 
to counteract by explicit declaration. 
The inquiry begins with a definition of federalism and, more specifical-
ly, with an account of the features that make federalism a distinctive mode of 
internal governance (Part I). Part II explores the effect of federalism on inter-
vention. After defining the range of possible justifications for intervention—
which run from rescue through humanitarian aid, suppression of terrorism 
and protection of human rights, establishment of self-determination, and fi-
nally regime change (Part A)—it assesses the impact of federalism on each of 
these justifications (Part B). It concludes with a more detailed discussion of 
the main impact that it finds, which is that federalism serves as a long-term 
solution following certain types of interventions and helps justify those inter-
ventions (Part C). Part III proceeds to discuss the less dramatic, but more 
widespread form of intervention that federalism might affect: the decision of 
one nation to respond to a request for trade or cultural relations with a subunit 
of another nation that potentially violates that other nation’s national policy. 
I. DEFINING THE ISSUE: FEDERALISM’S INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 
In order to evaluate the role of federalism in international relations, it 
is necessary to determine what federalism actually means. This has been a 
source of continued debate among scholars in the field. In some sense, of 
course, definitions are arbitrary, but federalism carries with it an array of 
associations that makes the term itself contested territory.14 A wide range of 
virtues have been claimed to flow from it.15 As a result, there is a certain 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1987) (describing the way political controversies focus on control of 
terminology). 
 15 See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FED-
ERALISM 386–88 (1993) (diffuses government power and protects liberty); Robert P. Inman & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Federalist Fiscal Constitution for an Imperfect World: Lessons from the 
United States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 79, 84–86 (Harry 
Scheiber ed., 1988) (allows people to choose preferred combination of government services); 
WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7–10 (1956) (diffuses 
government power and protects liberty); WALLACE OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972) (allows 
people to choose preferred combination of government services); Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals 
Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433 (2002) (diffuses government power, protects liberty, 
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argumentative and normative force that inheres in taking control of the term 
and asserting that one’s own view constitutes its real meaning. This leads, 
unfortunately, to conceptual confusion. In an effort to avoid these tenden-
cies, the discussion here focuses on the essential features of federalism, ra-
ther than attempting to settle on a particular definition. It will identify those 
features as a grant of juridical autonomy to subunits of a nation, a means of 
resolving questions of political identity, and a pragmatic solution that does 
not apply universally, but only to certain groups of people under certain cir-
cumstances. 
The most basic feature of a federal regime, as identified by William 
Riker, is that it has two levels of functioning government, one superior and 
the other subordinate; that it grants the subordinate level of autonomy over 
some significant areas of governance; and that it enforces this autonomy by 
some means that is regarded as definitive, typically judicial review of gov-
ernment decisions.16 Federalism can be contrasted with a unitary regime, 
where all political authority resides in the central government and no subor-
dinate entity is granted any legal autonomy. In other words, in a unitary or 
non-federal regime, subordinate entities, or subunits of the state, have no 
rights and are regarded as mere creatures of the central authority. 
Malcolm Feeley and I have pointed out in several previous publica-
tions that federalism must be distinguished from decentralization.17 Decen-
tralization is a managerial device whereby decisions are made by subordi-
nate units of an entity. In the context of government, decentralization, like 
federalism, involves at least two levels of governance and provides that 
some decisions will be made at the subordinate level. Unlike federalism, 
however, decentralization does not necessarily grant the subordinate enti-
ties, or subunits, any measure of autonomy. The allocation of decision-
making authority to subunits can be regarded as a matter for the central au-
                                                                                                                           
and allows people to choose preferred combination of government services); Charles Fried, Fed-
eralism: Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1982) (fosters experimentation); 
Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
847 (1979) (encourages experimentation); Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitu-
tional Theory, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 196, 205–09 (1991) (diffuses power and protects liberty); 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (allows 
people to choose preferred combination of government services); Barry R. Weingast, The Eco-
nomic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (1995) (preserves the free market). 
 16 WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964). 
 17 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAG-
IC COMPROMISE 20–29 (2008) [hereinafter FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY 
AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE]; MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 171–77 
(1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994) [hereinafter Rubin & Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a Na-
tional Neurosis]. 
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thority to determine, in its own discretion. While all federal regimes are 
necessarily decentralized to some extent—the subunits must be given some 
authority in order to possess any autonomy—not all decentralized regimes 
are federal. In a unitary regime, the central government can grant extensive 
authority to the subunits if it chooses, but it can also cancel any authority it 
has granted or countermand any one of the subunits’ decisions. 
The reason to insist on this distinction is that it is essential to under-
standing different modes of governance. Every nation larger than Monaco is 
decentralized to some extent.18 So are most large and medium-sized corpo-
rations or non-profits, universities and colleges, athletic leagues, religious 
organizations, criminal organizations, and virtually every other institution of 
any magnitude. Of course, the extent of decentralization will vary from in-
stitution to institution, and even from time to time within the same institu-
tion. But decentralization is a basic management technique, like hierarchy 
or record-keeping, that is almost universally employed in institutional de-
sign.19 
Federalism is a different matter. It is generally associated with political 
entities, and more specifically with nation states, and it is rare, though not 
unknown, in other types of institutions.20 It is not universal, but it represents 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See THOMAS M. ECCARDT, SECRETS OF THE SEVEN SMALLEST STATES OF EUROPE 12–13 
(2005) (describing internal governance of Monaco and other diminutive European states); LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AFFAIRS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: ANALYSES OF TWENTY 
WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 9 (Joachim Jens Hesse ed., 1991). The only nation small-
er than Monaco, which has an area of 0.76 square miles, ECCARDT, supra, at 269, is the Vatican, 
with an area of 0.2 square miles. ECCARDT, supra, at 315. San Marino, which measures twenty-
four square miles, ECCARDT, supra, at 291, is divided into nine districts, called castelli. ECCARDT, 
supra, at 12. Liechtenstein, at sixty-two square miles, is divided into two regions, one with six 
communes and the other with five. ECCARDT, supra, at 12. 
 19 See Kenneth Arrow & Leonid Hurweiz, Decentralization and Computation in Resource 
Allocation, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 34, 34 (Ralph W. Pfouts ed., 1960); 
ERNEST DALE, ORGANIZATION 104–30 (1967); Sumantra Ghoshal & Christopher Bartlett, The 
Multinational Corporation as an Interorganizational Network, in ORGANIZATION THEORY AND 
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 77, 77 (Sumantra Ghoshal & D. Eleanor Westney eds., 
1993); MANFRED KOCHEN & KARL DEUTSCH, DECENTRALIZATION: SKETCHES TOWARD A RA-
TIONAL THEORY (1980); WILLIAM T. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
(1968); John Tomaney, A New Paradigm of Work Organization and Technology?, in POST-
FORDISM: A READER 157, 157 (Ash Amin ed., 1994). 
 20 Most corporations are unitary, although the Japanese zaibatsu may be regarded as federal, 
in that the component companies are separate entities, see MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN JAPAN 605–06 (2000); EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 180–82 (1977), and 
modern multinational corporations may be moving toward federal-type organization, see Ghoshal 
& Bartlett, supra note 19. Most colleges and universities are unitary as well, but the Claremont 
Colleges can be described as federal. See ROBERT J. BERNARD, AN UNFINISHED DREAM: A 
CHRONICLE OF THE GROUP PLAN OF THE CLAREMONT COLLEGES (1982). The point is that a 
federal, or federal-type structure, is not impossible in non-political settings, but it tends to be rare. 
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a specific, often controversial, and in some ways problematic choice.21 Nat-
urally, there are gradations between unitary and federal regimes, as well as 
borderline cases that may be difficult to categorize; it seems safe to say that 
no nation organizes its internal affairs on the basis of conceptual purity. But 
the endpoints of the continuum reflect real, qualitative differences based on 
whether the subordinate units of the government have inviolable areas of 
autonomy, or, to use a different formulation, whether they have enforceable 
rights against the center. For example, proponents of American federalism 
often speak about the virtues of localities: they place the government closer 
to the people, they encourage participation, and they offer a choice between 
different bundles of government services.22 In fact, these are the principal 
reasons the U.S. Supreme Court has given for reviving the federalism doc-
trine.23 But local jurisdictions in the United States have nothing to do with 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, 
supra note 17, at 38–68; Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1025–41 (1997). 
 22 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of 
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487 (2003) (discussing advantages 
and disadvantages of local and state resource management); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (discussing the value of local 
governments in responding to diverse interests and implementing competition and innovation in 
government); Resnik, supra note 10 (discussing international relations conducted by American 
cities); Tiebout, supra note 15 (arguing that federalism allows people to choose among local juris-
dictions with different combinations of taxes and public services). In fact, much of the literature 
on fiscal federalism, which celebrates people’s ability to choose different bundles of taxation and 
government services by moving from one jurisdiction to another, is primarily about local commu-
nities, even if it uses the term “states.” While people may move from one state to another for these 
reasons (which generally requires them to change jobs or retire), the much more common pattern 
is that they keep the same job, but consider the tax and service pattern of different local jurisdic-
tions when making residential choices. Michael McConnell’s defense of “federalism,” for exam-
ple, states: “smaller units of government have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to 
adopt popular policies . . . . It is well known, for example, that families often choose a community 
on the basis of the school system; a better school system encourages development and raises prop-
erty values.” McConnell, supra, at 1498–99. 
 23 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing how federalism places govern-
ment close to the people, gives people a choice among different jurisdictions, and allows experi-
mentation with different solutions to widely-shared problems). Gregory was a statutory interpreta-
tion case involving the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Id. at 455. But in holding 
that the Act must be interpreted in light of federalism concerns, Justice O’Connor articulated the 
rationale that the Court subsequently relied upon in the constitutional cases that revived federalism 
doctrine, viz., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). For discussions, see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of 
Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 
(1995); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
674 (1995); and Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power 
and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199 (2003). 
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federalism,24 since no locality has any juridical rights against its own state 
or the national government as a matter of national law.25 Only states can be 
vehicles of federalist virtue under our system. 
In recent years, federalism scholarship regarding the United States has 
been greatly enriched by shifting its focus from rights enforced by the judi-
ciary to political and administrative relationships that are implemented by 
executive and legislative actors.26 This literature can be regarded as a sus-
tained inquiry into the mechanisms of decentralization. While juridical 
questions of state rights and sovereignty are not ignored, the new insights 
this literature has produced stem largely from its ability to go beyond such 
questions and consider issues of governance. For present purposes, the les-
son that the recent federalism literature offers is that relations between a 
central government and its subsidiary units are inevitably varied and com-
plex. Subsidiary units necessarily carry out various governmental functions 
in all nations, whether they are federal or unitary. 
Thus, allowing one nation to deal with subsidiary units of another on 
the basis of the fact that the subsidiary possesses a decision-making role 
would in effect dissolve the nation-state as the unit of international rela-
tions, and would constitute a complete rejection of the Westphalian system. 
The question here is whether the distinctive organization of some nations 
that characterizes true federalism—the grant of definitive rights to a subu-
nit—should be recognized as a modification within that system. This ques-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1307–08 (1994); Rubin & Feeley, Federalism: 
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra note 17, at 914–20. 
 25 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (powers of localities rest  
“in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental 
powers . . . constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. 
The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers . . . . All this may be 
done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against 
their protest”). For recent restatements, see Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70–72 
(1978); and Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967). 
 26 See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 272–80 (2011); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of 
American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938–39 (2014); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); William Wade Buzbee, Brown-
fields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, but as Empowerment, 
45 KAN. L. REV. 1219 (1997); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpre-
tation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 
(2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2011); Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’ Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411 
(2005); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popu-
lar Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2101 (2014); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of In-
teractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). 
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tion necessarily depends on the those features of federalism that illuminate 
its meaning and purpose. 
Feeley and I argue that the meaning and purpose of federalism is de-
rived from issues of political identity.27 Political identity refers to the way 
that people perceive their relationship toward controlling governmental in-
stitutions. Do they see themselves primarily as members of the nation in 
which they reside or as members of a distinct group that either crosses na-
tional boundaries or exists as a minority within a single nation?28 Percep-
tions of this sort are, of course, socially constructed, as Benedict Anderson 
has noted.29 There is no single factor apart from the perceptions themselves 
that determines people’s sense of political identity.30 In some cases, lan-
guage can be determinative, but many different nations, such as Australia 
and the U.K, Peru and Chile, Portugal and Brazil, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, 
or Germany and Austria, speak the same language, while other nations, such 
as India, China, Cameroon, and Papua New Guinea maintain a national 
identity despite a multiplicity of languages.31 This is equally true for reli-
                                                                                                                           
 27 FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, supra 
note 17, at 7–12, 43–60. 
 28 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMANY 406–40 (1984) 
(development of German national identity during the nineteenth century); EDMOND J. KELLER, 
IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA (2014) (disjunction of citizenship 
and political identity in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda); NATIONAL IDEN-
TITY, NATIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Frank Bechhofer & David McCrone eds., 
2009) (changing political identity in modern Britain); SERHII PLOKHY, THE GATES OF EUROPE 
147–73 (2015) (emergence of Ukrainian political identity, with a poet and a historian playing 
crucial roles); EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL 
FRANCE, 1870–1914 (1976) (emergence of national identity in rural France as a result of conscrip-
tion and national media); ADAM ZAMOYSKI, THE POLISH WAY: A THOUSAND-YEAR HISTORY OF 
THE POLES AND THEIR CULTURE 259–85 (1994) (maintenance of Polish national identity after 
partition eliminated Poland as a nation-state). 
 29 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 13–16 (1983); see also BERNARD YACK, NATIONALISM AND THE 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMUNITY 2–5 (2012) (socially constructed sense of community, 
based on “social friendship,” serves as the basis for nationalism in the individualistic modern era). 
 30 For general discussions of the issue of identity, and specifically of the way it affects peo-
ple’s sense of political and social community, see, for example, ANDERSON, supra note 29; MA-
NUEL CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY 1–67  (1997); JAMES FENTRISS & CHRIS WICKHAM, 
SOCIAL MEMORY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST 87–143 (1992); AMIN MAALOUF, IN THE 
NAME OF IDENTITY: VIOLENCE AND THE NEED TO BELONG 9–15 (Barbara Bray trans., 2000); 
ALAIN TOURAINE, CAN WE LIVE TOGETHER?: EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 186–88 (David 
Macey trans., 2000); JAMES A. VELA-MCCONNELL, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?: SOCIAL AFFINITY 
IN A MODERN WORLD 30–33 (1999); YACK, supra note 29, at 4. Regarding Somalia, a source of 
particular concern at present, see AFYARE ABDI ELMI, UNDERSTANDING THE SOMALIA CONFLA-
GRATION: IDENTITY, POLITICAL ISLAM AND PEACEBUILDING 28–47 (2010). 
 31 For a useful catalogue of languages and linguistic groups, see DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAM-
BRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE 292–339 (1987). There are some 500 Indo-Aryan lan-
guages spoken in north India and about twenty Dravidian languages, belonging to an entirely 
different linguistic family, spoken in south India. Id. at 301, 308. Apart from numerous Altaic, 
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gion and ethnicity. The same two religions that split Ireland into separate 
regimes32 produce no major difference in political identification in modern 
Canada or the United States.33 Within Africa, ethnic differences have pro-
duced separatist movements in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Sudan, but not in 
Kenya, Senegal, or Cameroon.34 
Federalism offers a way for a nation whose people have divided politi-
cal identities to remain intact or to function effectively. It provides a prag-
                                                                                                                           
Tai, Tibetic, and Miao-Yao languages spoken by ethnic minorities in China, the Han Chinese 
majority speaks eight different languages, which use the same written form, but are mutually unin-
telligible when spoken. Id. at 307, 310–13. Most sub-Saharan African nations have a number of 
different languages. See id. at 314; JOSEPH H. GREENBERG, THE LANGUAGES OF AFRICA 161–77 
(1966); Vic Webb & Kembo-Sure, The Languages of Africa, in AFRICAN VOICES: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LANGUAGES AND LINGUISTICS OF AFRICA 26, 26–27, 47–52 (Vic Webb & Kembo-
Sure eds., 2000). In Cameroon, which is the size of California and has a population of about twen-
ty million, over 200 different languages are spoken. See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CULTURE AND 
CUSTOMS OF CAMEROON 1, 5, 14–15 (2005). Papua New Guinea, roughly the same size but with 
only about six million people, has over 600 languages. CRYSTAL, supra, at 317. 
 32 See David Fitzpatrick, Ireland Since 1870, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF IRELAND 174, 
180–229 (R. F. Foster ed., 1989); DAVID MCKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE 
TROUBLES 1–25 (2000); CLAIRE MITCHELL, RELIGION, IDENTITY AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND: BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING AND BELIEF 1–20 (2006). 
 33 See MARK A. NOLL, THE OLD RELIGION IN A NEW WORLD: THE HISTORY OF NORTH 
AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 113–85 (2002) (Christian pluralism, acculturation, and fragmentation 
in Canada and the United States). European-Americans have remained more religious than their 
ancestors because religion in the United States serves as an important basis for people’s cultural 
identities. See STEVE BRUCE, GOD IS DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST 31–36, 219–20 
(2002); WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SO-
CIOLOGY 13 (1955). At the same time, these identities possess relatively low political salience for 
Americans, at least at the national level. Instead, the role of religion in people’s political identities 
has been to serve as a generalized commitment to a particular set of values, not a set of particular-
ized doctrines. Thus, Americans who see themselves as religious, whether Protestant, Catholic, or 
Jewish, tend to affiliate with conservative political forces, while those for whom religion is rela-
tively unimportant affiliate with liberal ones. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD & LEIGH E. SCHMIDT, THE 
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA 398–412 (2002); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: 
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 107–32 (1991). The upshot is that religion itself is an im-
portant source of political identity for Americans, but the religious distinctions that loomed so 
large in European history have only cultural significance, and are thus not a source of political 
division. This demonstrates the way that similar belief structures can have different meanings in 
different political contexts. 
 34 See TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 158–208 (2008); 
ROBERT D. KAPLAN, SURRENDER OR STARVE: TRAVELS IN ETHIOPIA, SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND 
ERITREA 99–104 (2003); KELLER, supra note 28, at 51–86, 103–24 (Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ken-
ya); HAROLD G. MARCUS, A HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA 199–201 (1994); MARTIN MEREDITH, THE 
FATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 193–217, 270–71, 399–400 
(2005) (Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon); RAPH UWECHUE, REFLECTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN 
CIVIL WAR 62–67 (1971). Several observers suggest that, despite unquestionable ethnic differ-
ences within the new African nations, the ethnic conflict was generated by political factors, either 
the legacy of colonialism, see BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE 
CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE 228–230 (1992), or the divisive policies of political leaders, see 
BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE AND POWER IN THE HEART OF 
AFRICA 124–125, 139–40 (2001). 
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matic alternative to secession, oppression, or deep and continuous dissatis-
faction. The reason a central government would agree to permanently relin-
quish some of its authority to a governmental subunit is to satisfy a group of 
citizens who have a separate political identity and demand some sort of au-
tonomy for the subordinate government that rules their region. The reason 
any group of people within the society would expend their energy and polit-
ical capital on such a challenging demand is that they possess a separate 
identity of this sort. In fact, if they did not have a separate political identity, 
they could probably not even conceptualize a demand for federalism, and 
they would most likely be unable to mobilize any significant political sup-
port for it. 
An important limit on the applicability of federalism as a governance 
strategy, and one that emphasizes its pragmatic character, is that the group 
of people who have a separate political identity must be geographically 
concentrated.35 More particularly, a significant portion of the group must be 
located in a delimited region and they must generally constitute the domi-
nant population of that region. Since federalism, by definition, grants au-
tonomy to geographic subunits of the nation, it serves no value if the group 
in question is geographically dispersed. Muslims in France, Christians in 
Lebanon, Russians in Kazakhstan, and African-Americans in the United 
States may have separate political identities, but because they do not domi-
nate any specific region of their country, federalism cannot do them any 
good and they must turn to other mechanisms. Thus, federalism cannot be 
viewed as something that should be provided to all people, or even all peo-
ple of a given nation. It is a device that can be used to satisfy particular de-
mands by groups of people who, due to accidents of history, are in a posi-
tion to make use of it. 
This intrinsic limit on the applicability of federalism leads to a more 
general point. Federalism is not an independent principle of government, 
like liberty, social equality, or self-determination. There is no normative 
account that makes federalism desirable per se. Rather, as will be discussed 
in greater detail below, it is a pragmatic strategy; a means of organizing the 
internal structure of a nation in order to solve a specific set of problems. It 
can thus be described as a tragic compromise.36 Arguably, it would be pref-
                                                                                                                           
 35 RAMESH DUTTA DIKSHIT, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF FEDERALISM: AN INQUIRY 
INTO ORIGINS AND STABILITY 10–12 (1975); see IVO D. DUCHACEK, COMPARATIVE FEDERAL-
ISM: THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF POLITICS 53–57 (1970); Will Kymlicka, Is Federalism a 
Viable Alternative to Secession?, in THEORIES OF SECESSION 111, 119–22 (Percy B. Lehning ed., 
1998); James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Para-
digms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251 (1994). 
 36 FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, supra 
note 17, at 38–60. 
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erable if everyone in a given nation possessed the same political identity so 
that there was no problem of this sort to be resolved. This is not a Panglos-
sian fantasy; rather, it is the situation that applies in many nations, such as 
France, Chile, Japan, and, as Feeley and I have argued elsewhere, the con-
temporary United States.37 Where it does not apply, however, and a sub-
optimal solution must be found, federalism is often a satisfactory choice, 
and sometimes a particularly good one. 
II. FEDERALISM AND DEFINITIVE INTERVENTION 
The single most important way in which federalism might be relevant 
in international relations is to affect the crucial decision about whether one 
nation should intervene in the internal affairs of another. As noted at the 
outset, the Right to Protect provisions in the 2005 Outcome Document rec-
ognize and, under certain circumstances, encourage such intervention, while 
international terrorism often provides a strong motivation for it. The feder-
alist character of a nation—that is, the degree to which the nation grants 
autonomy to its subsidiary units—might well change what constitutes an 
internal affair and thereby change another nation’s willingness to intervene. 
It might be said that the federalized nation’s subunits are visible to outside 
nations in a way that the fully subordinated divisions of a unitary state are 
not. A natural question, therefore, is whether outside nations can rely on or 
respond to these divisions.38 
A. The Spectrum of Definitive Intervention 
The starting point for answering this question is the basic principle of 
the Westphalian system: the sovereignty of each nation and the consequent 
presumption against intervention in its internal affairs by any other nation.39 
If one is prepared to argue that sovereignty is irrelevant, and that nations 
should intervene in the affairs of other nations to the same extent they po-
lice themselves,40 then the fact that a particular nation is federal will make 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. at 96–123; see Rubin & Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra 
note 17, at 944–48; Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001); Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of 
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1049–63. 
 38 There are many other international law issues of course, but they generally do not implicate 
the federal character of the nations involved. Even so closely allied a question as whether it is 
permissible for a particular nation to act as intervener (as opposed to a particular nation being the 
subject of intervention) does not depend on federalism-related concerns. There does not appear to 
be any international law argument that would make Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland better or 
worse interveners than France, Japan, and Uruguay. 
 39 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 40 Stated in this way, few people would fully subscribe to this view. But some scholars favor 
intervention strongly enough to suggest that the federal nature of the subject nation might well be 
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no difference. If one believes that sovereignty is sacrosanct and that inter-
vention is never justified except in cases of genuine self-protection or pro-
tection of an ally, then the federal nature of a given nation will be similarly 
irrelevant. But in the vast middle ground, where distinctions are made and 
there is room for movement in one direction or another, the federal nature of 
the regime against which intervention is contemplated could well make a 
considerable difference. 
As widely noted, there is a range of ways by which one nation might 
intervene in the affairs of another.41 For purposes of this discussion, the 
main qualification is that the intervention must be definitive, that is, it must 
be an identifiable, specific action by one nation that intentionally affects 
another nation in opposition to the second nation’s desires.42 Otherwise, the 
action in question merges into ordinary relations among nations, since near-
ly all international relations can be said to affect the internal affairs of the 
interacting nations to some extent. 
 Definitive interventions, as just defined, can be arranged along a spec-
trum based on the extent to which the intervening nation is affecting the 
internal affairs of the subject nation. At one end, which can be described as 
the weakest form of intervention, is rescue—an effort by one nation to ex-
tract its own citizens, or the citizens of an ally, from dangers to which the 
subject nation has exposed them. Implicit in the idea of a true rescue is that 
the intervener has no desire to affect the subject nation at all; the intention is 
to take control of the endangered group and get them out.43 
                                                                                                                           
irrelevant to their considerations. See, e.g., Simon Caney, Humanitarian Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, in ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 117, 120–22, 131 (Andrew Valls ed., 2000); 
LEONARD W. DOOB, INTERVENTION: GUIDES & PERILS 143–45 (1993); EVANS, supra note 2; 
David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 166, 170–73 (1980); W. 
Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 642, 644–45 (1984). 
 41 See, e.g., FIERKE, supra note 12 (categorizing interventions as moral, legal, military, eco-
nomic, cultural, and therapeutic); Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in INTER-
VENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 12, at 29, 29–44; Stanley Hoffman, The Problem of 
Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 12, at 7, 7–28. 
 42 The other qualification is that the action must constitute a true intervention. For example, 
initiating legal action under a treaty is not an intervention, because the subject nation has submit-
ted itself to the treaty regime and the acting nation is only insisting on its rights under that treaty. 
Again, this is a large topic that need not be discussed at length for present purposes. The question 
for the article is whether federalisDm affects those actions that are viewed, by general agreement, 
as true interventions. 
 43 See Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is there a Right of Humanitarian 
Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTER-
VENTION, supra note 12, at 21, 36–37; SHAW, supra note 1, at 1032–34; C. H. M. Waldock, The 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 
451, 488–94 (1952); Michael Walzer, The Politics of Rescue, 62 SOC. RES. 53, 56, 61 (1995). 
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The next step along the spectrum involves humanitarian assistance, 
which can be distinguished from rescue on two grounds.44 First, it generally 
involves citizens of the subject nation, not of the intervening nation. Second, 
the goal is not to extract these citizens, but to alleviate their situation within 
the nation to which they belong. This will generally require the intervener to 
produce a considerably greater impact on the subject nation’s regime than 
would be necessary for a rescue.45 The normative bases for humanitarian in-
tervention stated in the U.N.’s World Summit Outcome Document are “geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”46 Genocide 
is strictly and narrowly defined by the U.N. Convention,47 but the other terms 
are general and cover a wide range of actions by the subject nation.48 To these 
might be added naturally occurring disasters such as famine, epidemic, earth-
quake, or flood if the nation in which they occur is either unable to respond, 
refuses, or seriously impedes external assistance.49 
                                                                                                                           
 44 For discussions of humanitarian intervention generally, see Michael Akehurst, Humanitari-
an Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 12, at 95, 95–118; EVANS, 
supra note 2; GARRETT, supra note 12, at 5–6; HEHIR, supra note 12, at 20, 22–24; HUMANITAR-
IAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 4–5; HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 12, at 130; Thomas 
Franck, Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION, supra note 12, at 143, 143–57; TERRY, supra note 12, at 17; WEISS, supra note 2; Thomas 
G. Weiss & Jarat Chopra, Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian Space, in 
BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note 
12, at 87, 87–114; WHEELER, supra note 12, at 33–34; and YAMASHITA, supra note 12, at 1–4. 
 45 See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 143–44 (2d 
ed. 2003) (noting that it is generally regarded as justifiable to provide humanitarian assistance to a 
reprehensible regime). 
 46 World Summit Outcome, supra note 2, ¶ 139. 
 47 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“[A]cts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such . . . .”). For a discussion, see SAMANTHA POWER, “A 
PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002); and WILLIAM A. SCHA-
BAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 72–73 (2000). The term “gen-
ocide” was first introduced in RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79–82 (1944). Lemkin was 
also instrumental in securing the adoption of the Convention. See JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEM-
KIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 173–88 (2008). 
 48 See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 52, at 101–08 (limiting military intervention to these extreme 
situations). Combating some of these actions might not constitute intervention, however. In many 
cases, and particularly in the category of war crimes, the acts about which the Outcome Document 
is concerned might occur in the course of armed conflict between nations, and might involve the 
behavior of the subject nation’s armed forces in occupying another nation. Combatting those forc-
es cannot be regarded as intervention in the internal affairs of the subject nation. 
 49 One common basis for humanitarian intervention involves a failed state that can no longer 
protects its citizens from either human violence or natural disasters, with Somalia being a prime 
example. See BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 9, at 181–83. The internal structure of the subject 
nation does not seem to make a difference in this case, since that structure, whatever it was, has 
ceased to function. On the moral and pragmatic aspects of the humanitarian intervention in Soma-
lia, see JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: RE-
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Intervention to counteract the abuse of human rights or to suppress ter-
rorism represents a further step along the spectrum.50 In addition to military 
force, which is necessary for either rescue or humanitarian intervention, this 
further intervention can consist of economic sanctions such as boycott or 
embargo.51 As a result, it may seem to be a milder form of intervention than 
rescue or humanitarian aid.52 In fact, counteracting human rights abuses or 
suppressing terrorism produces a greater impact on the subject nation’s re-
gime—first, because it addresses the political status of people who reside 
in, and are often citizens of, that nation; and second because it generally 
involves an ongoing, rather than an emergency, situation. Of course, such 
an intervention can overlap with humanitarian assistance. It is not difficult 
to argue that a nation that allows a group of its citizens to starve or die of a 
curable disease is committing a human rights violation of its own, or that a 
nation that allows terrorists to flourish in its midst is subjecting to danger its 
own citizens and citizens of other nations.53 Despite this overlap, it is quite 
                                                                                                                           
FLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 161–63 (1995); Andrew S. Natsios, Humani-
tarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos, in LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: 
THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 77, 77–95 (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey 
Herbst eds., 1997); and KENNETH R. RUTHERFORD, HUMANITARIANISM UNDER FIRE: THE US 
AND UN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 178–79 (2008). 
 50 In international law, the leading definition of human rights is the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Decla-
ration]. This was supplemented by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
The three documents are collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights. 
 51 See generally ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & JENNIFER M. HARRIS, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: 
GEOECONOMICS AND STATECRAFT 20 (2016) (discussing geoeconomics, which is defined as 
“[t]he use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce bene-
ficial geopolitical results”); ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Richard N. 
Haass ed., 1998) (observing that economic sanctions are increasingly central to American foreign 
policy and assessing their effectiveness in specific instances); HONEY AND VINEGAR: INCEN-
TIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY (Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O’Sullivan eds., 2000) 
(arguing for the expansion of “engagement,” that is, positive incentives, as a way for the United 
States to influence foreign nations); SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000) (analysis, using varied methodologies, of 
the effectiveness of sanctions and incentives in international relations); GEOFF SIMONS, IMPOSING 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LEGAL REMEDY OR GENOCIDAL TOOL? (1999) (describing economic 
sanctions, and arguing that they often make innocent people within the subject nation suffer); cf. 
BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 9 (discussing various ways for the United States to exercise 
coercion, which is defined as any means short of brute force). 
 52 Economic sanctions may thus be contrasted with a blockade, which is an act of war. See  
SHAW, supra note 1, at 1155–66; MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL AR-
GUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 172–75 (5th ed. 2015). 
 53 It can also conflict with humanitarian concerns, since boycotts and embargoes often pro-
duce their effect by causing the citizens of the subject nation to suffer, and put pressure on their 
government in response. See POLITICAL GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN: HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 16–21 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 1997). 
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possible to distinguish between the two situations, as Michael Walzer does 
in his well-known discussion of just war.54 
Further along the definitive intervention spectrum are interventions to 
establish or enforce the self-determination of a group of people in the sub-
ject nation.55 Such intervention affects the subject nation’s political regime 
directly and intensively, being a direct challenge to its basic structure. Once 
again, this category can be merged with the prior one by simply defining 
self-determination as a human right. But there are conceptual advantages to 
making the distinction, despite its theoretical difficulties. Human rights in-
volve the status of people, either individually or as a group, within the sub-
ject nation, while self-determination involves a group’s entire relationship 
to that nation. 
The extreme end of the intervention spectrum consists of efforts to im-
pose a particular kind of government on the nation as a whole. This produces 
the most extensive impact on the nation’s political regime, apart from outright 
conquest, since it represents an effort to change that regime in its entirety. 
Interventions of this sort were a particular feature of the European religious 
wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where nations aligned with 
                                                                                                                           
 54 WALZER, supra note 52, at 101–08. For a discussion, see infra pp. 215–20. The situations 
are distinguishable because the subject nation may not have the capacity to prevent a group of 
citizens from starving or dying of disease, but nonetheless object to outside assistance as an intru-
sion on its sovereignty, in which case its only human rights violation would be the tautological 
one of objecting to assistance. On the other hand, denying a group of citizens due process of law 
or their ability to follow their religion cannot be described as an emergency; it represents an ongo-
ing situation resulting from a political choice by the subject nation. The point here, as in the case 
of federalism and decentralization, is to allocate two different terms to two distinguishable situa-
tions, an approach that is useful for analytic purposes. While the choice of terms is intended to 
correspond as closely as possible to ordinary meaning, no assertion is being made that these terms 
are invariably used in this manner in the literature. In fact, they are often conflated, sometimes for 
rhetorical impact. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE (Philip 
Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008) (discussing interventions to protect human rights, but de-
scribing them as humanitarian, Chapter 3 being titled “Human Rights and Collective Security: Is 
There an Emerging Right of Humanitarian Intervention?”); Caney, supra note 40 (describing 
intervention as based on the duty of a nation to ensure that other nations respect human rights); 
Nancy Sherman, Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention, 12 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 103 
(1998) (describing humanitarian intervention as protecting people’s right to pursue autonomous 
projects); Fernando R. Tesòn, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARI-
AN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Keohane eds., 2003) (describing humanitarian intervention as “forcible intervention to protect 
human rights”). 
 55 On the principle of self-determination generally, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMA-
CY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 331–425 
(2007); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); 
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION 
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (rev. ed. 1996); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND 
NATIONAL MINORITIES (2000); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); and Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 
352 (1995). 
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two rival ideologies, Catholic and Protestant, contested with each other for 
control of individual principalities or states.56 The savagely destructive char-
acter of this struggle, together with the injection of French realpolitik,57 lead 
to the Peace of Westphalia and its principle of sovereignty. A similarly ideo-
logical struggle occurred during the Cold War, when both the United States 
and the Soviet Union intervened to impose capitalist or communist regimes 
on European and then Asian, African, and Latin American nations.58 But the 
end of the Cold War did not end this mode of intervention. The rise of inter-
national terrorism has led to arguments that an attack by terrorists tolerated or 
encouraged by another nation is equivalent to an attack by that other nation 
itself, and justifies an effort to overthrow that other nation’s government. This 
argument has merged with the belief that democracy is the only legitimate 
form of government59 in order to justify efforts to effect regime change in 
several nations, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. 
B. The Impact of Federalism in General 
In exploring the impact of federalism on these various types of inter-
ventions, a number of questions present themselves. First, is the federal 
character of the subject nation, considered on its own, a relevant considera-
tion for an external nation’s decision about whether it should intervene? 
Second, does a request for intervention from a subunit of a federalized na-
tion provide greater justification for intervening than a request from some 
other group within that nation, or from a subunit of a unitary nation? Third, 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559–1715 (2d ed. 1979); MARK 
KONNERT, EARLY MODERN EUROPE: THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WAR 1559–1715 (2d ed. 2006); 
DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY (2003). 
 57 See DAVID OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 120–274 (1960); GEOFFREY 
TREASURE, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 146–80 (1967). Catholic France was an inveterate 
enemy of the Habsburg Empire, which championed the Catholic cause, and thus generally inter-
vened on behalf of the Protestants, despite its suppression of Protestantism within its own bounda-
ries. See OGG, supra, at 293–97; TREASURE, supra, at 368–95. Thus, once France had resolved its 
internal religious wars in favor of Catholicism and resumed its leading role in international affairs, 
the ability of the pro-Catholic forces to put pressure on Protestant regimes essentially came to an 
end. This example cautions against interpreting international conflict in purely ideological terms, 
even when the participants cast the conflict in those terms. 
 58 See Philip Windsor, Superpower Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, 
supra note 12, at 45, 45–65. 
 59 See LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCI-
ETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 12–13 (2008); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 47 (1992); see also BUCHANAN, supra note 55, at 
142–47, 314–22 (new states should only be recognized if they are democratic, other states should 
eventually become democratic); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xviii–xix (2011) (arguing that globalization will 
often conflict with democratization, and that, in such cases, the requirements of the global econo-
my should yield to nations’ superior right to establish and protect democratic government). 
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does the possibility of imposing or restoring federalism offer a pragmatic 
resolution of the presenting problem that renders the initial intervention 
more justifiable? 
It is difficult to formulate an answer to these questions by referring to 
the juridical concept of federalism. That concept only establishes that the 
subunits of the nation have certain rights against the central government. It 
emerges from the competing forces of regional autonomy and centralized 
control, but offers no criterion by which these forces might be balanced 
against each other. If federalism is conceived as a question of political iden-
tity, however, then the value of federalism in a given situation can be tested 
by asking whether the basis for intervention is the conflicting political iden-
tities of the people in the subject nation, and whether intervention can re-
solve the situation. Further clarity can be achieved by recognizing that fed-
eralism, although defined in terms of rights, is in fact a pragmatic political 
compromise. It makes no sense to ask whether people have a right to feder-
alism. The relevant question is whether federalism is a means by which 
people’s real rights can be secured. 
Beginning with the weak, or least intrusive, end of the intervention 
spectrum, it would appear that the federal nature of the subject nation 
makes no difference in a case of rescue. The rescuer has no normative inter-
est in the internal affairs of the subject nation, although of course it may 
need to be knowledgeable about those affairs at the pragmatic level to effec-
tuate the rescue. Rather, it is simply trying to extract a group of people, 
generally its own citizens or the citizens of an ally, and leave the subject 
nation to its fate. The request for intervention is coming from a group of 
people whose political identity is that of foreigners and thus is unlikely to 
have any connection to the unitary or federal structure of the subject nation. 
The remedy consists simply of their rescue, which will enable them to leave 
the nation, although they may, of course, choose to go back when the crisis 
is resolved. 
Humanitarian assistance necessarily engages the internal situation in 
the subject nation more directly, since it typically involves that nation’s citi-
zens and, as a general matter, anticipates that those citizens will remain 
within the nation, even if they must be temporarily evacuated.60 Again, 
                                                                                                                           
 60 It might involve encamped refugees, but in most such cases, humanitarian assistance would 
not be a form of intervention. The arrival of the refugees might result from either a decision of the 
host nation, as sovereign, or from a breach of its sovereignty, but in either case, humanitarian aid 
to those refugees would generally not be regarded by the host nation as a separate breach of its 
sovereign status. The question involving refugees is whether there are any obligations, on the part 
of the host nation or other nations, to provide assistance. See generally Chris Brown, The Only 
Thinkable Figure? Ethical and Normative Approaches to Refugees in International Relations, in 
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 151, 151–67 (Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds., 
2011) (discussing moral duties of nations toward refugees in terms of the host nation, rather than 
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however, the federal or unitary character of the subject nation would not 
appear to make a difference in deciding whether intervention is justified. 
The criteria for intervening in this case depends on the scope and intensity 
of the victims’ suffering, not on the political structure of the subject nation. 
Ethnic cleansing, for example, is just as serious and just as valid a basis for 
intervention if it is carried out against people who regard themselves as 
members of the nation, as did Germany’s Jews or Ruanda’s Tutsi, as it is if 
it is carried out against people who regard themselves as members of a con-
quered or potentially independent nation, as Nigeria’s Biafrans or the for-
mer Yugoslavia’s Croats apparently did.61 
A much more complex set of questions, and ones that implicate feder-
alism issues to a much greater extent, involve the next step along the spec-
trum: interventions to prevent violations of human rights, to support de-
mands for self-determination, or to suppress terrorist activity. These inter-
ventions generally respond to on-going situations in the subject nation, ra-
ther than an immediate life-threatening crisis. To validate them, therefore, 
constitutes a more extensive rejection of the sovereignty principle. 
It does not appear that federalism would be relevant to interventions 
directed toward suppressing a terrorist organization headquartered in the 
subject nation. The justification for the intervention is the impact on the 
intervener, and the subject nation’s toleration or encouragement of the ter-
                                                                                                                           
the nation of origin); Jack Snyder, Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism, in 
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra, at 29 (describing realistic strategies for host 
nations to provide refugees with effective humanitarian assistance); TERRY, supra note 12 (de-
scribing moral dilemmas that aid agencies face when providing aid to refugees and recommending 
realistic and strategic action). 
 61 On Nigeria and Biafra, see CHINUA ACHEBE, THERE WAS A COUNTRY: A PERSONAL HIS-
TORY OF BIAFRA (2012) (personal account by a Biafran novelist of the conflict); FALOLA & HEA-
TON, supra note 34, at 159–60, 175–76; MICHAEL GOULD, THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERN NIGE-
RIA: THE BIAFRAN WAR 1967–1970, at 1–4 (2012); MEREDITH, supra note 34, at 193–205; JOHN 
DE ST. JORRE, THE BROTHERS’ WAR: BIAFRA AND NIGERIA 236–38 (1972); and UWECHUE, su-
pra note 34, at 50–52. On Yugoslavia, see DAVID N. GIBBS, FIRST DO NO HARM: HUMANITARI-
AN INTERVENTION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 10–14 (2009) (account of American 
and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia); and LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: 
DEATH OF A NATION 26–27 (1997). In many cases of ethnic cleansing, the political identity of the 
victims is uncertain and confused because the actions are being carried out by those who define 
the victims in ethnic, rather than political terms. This applies to the expulsion of the Germans from 
Eastern Europe, see R. M. DOUGLAS, ORDERLY AND HUMANE: THE EXPULSION OF THE GER-
MANS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 101 (2012); ALFRED-MAURICE DE ZAYAS, A TERRIBLE 
REVENGE: THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF THE EAST EUROPEAN GERMANS (2d ed. 2006), and the 
expulsion of the Georgians from Abkhazia, which was condemned by United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 62/249. G.A. Res. 62/249 (May 29, 2008); see TOM TRIER, HEDVIG LOHM 
& DAVID SZAKONYI, UNDER SIEGE: INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ABKHAZIA 2 (2010). Although 
the structural criteria for political identity can be determined in these cases (both the Germans and 
Georgians were ethnically distinct, and belonged to a group which constituted the majority in 
another nation), the attitudinal criteria are uncertain because the victims are not initiating the ac-
tion involved. 
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rorist organization.62 Neither depends on the internal organization of the 
nation in question. It is conceivable that a nation might attempt to deny re-
sponsibility by asserting that the terrorists were headquartered in a region 
that it was unable to control. But this would be equivalent to a concession 
by the subject nation that this region had seceded, thus precluding that na-
tion from resisting intervention on grounds of Westphalian sovereignty. In 
effect, the region would have become a separate nation and thus be subject 
to attack on the same grounds as any nation that harbored or encouraged 
terrorists. 
The situations where federalism might be directly relevant involve an 
intervention to protect the human rights or secure the self-determination of 
the people in one region of the nation who claim that they are being op-
pressed by the central government. In contrast to humanitarian intervention, 
these interventions are not recognized as legitimate in international law at 
present63 and receive more limited scholarly support.64 Nevertheless, inter-
                                                                                                                           
 62 The extent to which a nation subject to a terrorist attack is entitled to intervene in another 
nation that is arguably the source of the attack is, of course, a matter of controversy. See BYMAN 
& WAXMAN, supra note 9, at 130–51 (American public demands that intervention be framed in 
terms of both national interest and morality and often confuses to the two); MATTHEW EVANGE-
LISTA, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 1 (2008) (efforts to combat terrorism may un-
dermine the legal order that these efforts purport to protect); MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE 
OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE 85–140 (2003) (intervention to 
preserve international order is subject to changing and evolving norms); SITARAMAN, supra note 
10 (modern counterinsurgency will only be effective if guided by legal rules); Rosa Ehrenreich 
Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the 
Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 714 (2004) (existing laws of war are not applicable to 
attacks on terrorist networks); Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the 
“Global War on Terrorism,” 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 165, 190 (2005) (complexity results from the fact 
that terrorist groups do not follow the laws of war). 
 63 See G.A. Res. 20/2131, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Interference in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965) 
(adopted by a vote of 109-0-1); G.A. Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Interfer-
ence and Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981) (adopted by a vote of 120-6-
2). The later Resolution declares: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene or inter-
fere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States.” 
Id. para. 1. It also imposes a duty on states “to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of 
human rights issues as a means of interference in the internal affairs of States.” Id. para. II(l). The 
World Summit Outcome can be seen as a qualification of this definitive endorsement of the sover-
eignty principle, but it is limited to humanitarian assistance, and does not extend to the enforce-
ment of human rights. World Summit Outcome, supra note 2. 
 64 For criticisms, see, for example, Kratochwil, supra note 43 (people cannot be forced to be 
free); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 35–44, 59–82 (1999) (nations that do not protect hu-
man rights, as defined by Western democracies, are nonetheless entitled to respect it if they gov-
ern effectively); David Copp, The Idea of a Legitimate State, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1999) 
(same); and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 49 
(1997) (intervention to protect human rights unjustifiably imposes values of one culture on anoth-
er). For support, see Caney, supra note 40; Luban, supra note 40, at 179–81; Sherman, supra note 
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vention to protect human rights or to enforce self-determination possesses 
strong normative appeal in many situations. External nations are urged to 
intervene by the citizens of the subject nation whose rights are being violat-
ed or whose self-determination is being denied.65 Suppose these citizens are 
members of a federalized unit, that is, a unit whose partial autonomy is rec-
ognized by the central government. Does this change the justifiability of 
intervention on human rights or self-determination grounds? Does the 
greater international visibility of a federalized unit mean that external na-
tions should be permitted to respond in ways that would be considered im-
permissible in the case of unitary nations? 
There would appear to be an argument on either side of this question. 
Federalism constitutes a partial recognition that the citizens of the subordi-
nate unit in question, or at least a significant proportion of them, possess a 
separate political identity. This might mean that they are more likely to be 
oppressed by the central government from a human rights perspective or 
that they are more entitled to full independence from a self-determination 
perspective. But if the nation is federal, it means that these citizens have 
already been granted some element of autonomy. That would seem to place 
them in a better position than citizens of a unitary nation who suffer an 
equivalent denial of human rights or self-determination. 
The question is necessarily one of perspective. From the perspective of 
a group of people who possess a separate political identity, the federal char-
acter of the nation to which they belong can be viewed as the basis for their 
membership in that nation. That is to say, their willingness to be part of the 
larger nation depends on their being granted partial autonomy. The nation’s 
federal structure thus reflects a concession on their part, and a promise of 
fair treatment from the central government that they should be able to en-
force, if necessary with outside assistance. In contrast, from the perspective 
of the nation’s central government, and, in many cases, the majority of the 
population whose political identity is aligned with that government, the 
                                                                                                                           
54, at 103, 105; and Tesòn, supra note 54, all of whom regard intervention to protect human rights 
as a form of humanitarian intervention. 
 65 See, e.g., FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 34, at 158–80 (Biafra); MEREDITH, supra note 
34, at 204 (Biafra); Natsios, supra note 49, at 57–79, 163–69 (South Sudan); RICHARD SISSON & 
LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH 
(1990); WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL, A HISTORY OF BANGLADESH 159–90 (2009); MATTHEW 
LERICHE & MATTHEW ARNOLD, SOUTH SUDAN: FROM REVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE 97–112 
(2012); GIBBS, supra note 61, at 76–105 (Croatia’s appeal to Germany), 106–70 (Bosnia’s appeal 
to the United States), 171–204 (Kosovo’s appeal to the United States). Several of these authors, 
particularly Gibbs and Meredith, point out that the appeals are often generated by cynical efforts 
by the schismatic region’s elite. But it is hardly to be expected that the central government would 
be the embodiment of evil while the schismatic region would consist of pure and innocent suffer-
ers. That is one reason why difficult questions arise about whether intervention is morally justifia-
ble and pragmatically effective. 
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grant of autonomy is a favor that has been conferred on a subgroup of their 
nation’s citizens. The federal character of the nation thus represents a con-
cession to that subgroup by the majority. Therefore, the subgroup is not jus-
tified in requesting external assistance, perhaps even less justified than 
groups that have not been granted that concession. 
One possible way to resolve the conflict between the two perspectives 
in a systematic way is to determine whether the central and subordinate 
governments are separate polities that have joined together to form a single 
nation or a single nation that, like virtually all nations, has decentralized sub-
units.66 This question, however, is often too theoretical or counter-factual to 
answer. History can be invoked, but its meaning is likely to be uncertain and 
open to conflicting interpretations that reiterate the basic disagreement.67 
Even more awkwardly, given the current prevalence and popularity of de-
mocracy, the question cannot be resolved by the democratic means of vot-
ing because it requires a preliminary, and necessarily non-democratic, de-
termination of whether the electorate consists of the subunits, voting sepa-
rately, or of the nation as a whole.68 
The dependence of these questions on the perspective one adopts reveals 
a lack of clarity in Michael Walzer’s discussion of forcible intervention.69 
Walzer wants to limit such interventions, which he regards as a type of war, to 
the egregious situations that “shock the conscience of mankind.”70 These are, 
presumably, the ones envisioned by the World Summit Outcome Document. 
His justification for this limit relies heavily on John Stuart Mill’s idea that the 
government and the oppressed population are part of the same community71 
and thus should be left alone to resolve their own political problems, except 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, 
supra note 17, at 40–48; Rubin, supra note 21, at 1013–20. 
 67 Consider Spain, a nation with a rich, well-documented history and a current controversy 
over secession, federalism, and unity. At the beginning of the Reconquest (dating roughly from 
the fall of the Caliphate in 1031) there were five or six small Christian kingdoms in the north. See 
JOSEPH F. O’CALLAGHAN, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL SPAIN 163–90 (1975). By the Golden Age 
(16th century) all of modern Spain was ruled by a single, and in fact absolutist monarchy. See J. H. 
ELLIOTT, IMPERIAL SPAIN: 1469–1716, at 66 (1963). A number of regions, including Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, and Galicia, have retained separate, strongly felt identities. See JOHN HOOP-
ER, THE NEW SPANIARDS 217–82 (2d ed. 2006). An enormous amount of historical evidence sup-
ports the contention that these regions, and others, should be regarded as separate entities that 
joined together, and a similar amount supports the contention that they are parts of a single entity 
that are demanding partial (or total) autonomy. 
 68 FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, supra 
note 17, at 40–43; see Rubin, supra note 21, at 1013–18. 
 69 See WALZER, supra note 52, at 101–08; Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A 
Response to Four Critics, 9 PHI. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1980). 
 70 WALZER, supra note 52, at 107. 
 71 JOHN STUART MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND 
HISTORICAL 238 (1867). For Walzer’s discussion of Mill, see WALZER, supra note 52, at 87–95. 
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in cases of the most egregious abuse.72 What we would need to know in order 
to apply this test, however, is how to determine whether the minority is a 
member of the same community, and can therefore be left under the control of 
the majority, or whether it is a separate community whose human rights—the 
issue at stake—need outside protection. The nation’s federal character is am-
biguous in this regard. As argued above,73 it might indicate that the nation 
consists of separate communities that have agreed to join together under cer-
tain conditions, or it might indicate that the nation is a single community that 
has granted partial autonomy to groups within it for various purposes, such as 
achieving internal harmony or fostering cultural diversity. 
 Allen Buchanan, one of the few international law scholars to discuss 
federalism, points to a further complexity.74 Suppose, he says, international 
law were to accept the principle that “a federal unit may secede if there is a 
very substantial majority voting in favor of secession, in a free and fair 
plebiscite, within the boundaries of that federal unit.”75 Such a principle 
would create “perverse incentives” because “[n]onfederal states will under-
standably be reluctant to entertain proposals for federalism if doing so may 
make them vulnerable to dismemberment by plebiscite.”76 While Buchanan 
                                                                                                                           
 72 This is the point that has been most consistently challenged by Walzer’s critics, who accuse 
him of granting states too much authority or legitimacy. See, e.g., Caney, supra note 40, at 123; 
Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of International Intervention, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 24, 36 (Anthony Ellis ed., 1986); Charles R. Beitz, Bounded Morality: Justice and the State 
in World Politics, 33 INT’L ORG. 405, 409 (1979); Gerald Doppelt, Walzer’s Theory of Morality in 
International Relations, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4–5 (1978); Luban, supra note 40, at 179–81; 
Tesòn, supra note 54, at 102–08; Richard Wasserstrom, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 536, 544 
(1978). Walzer responds to some of these in Walzer, supra note 69. Since this article is not about 
the justifiability of intervention generally, but about the impact of federalism on such justifica-
tions, the argument in the text, to reiterate, is that Walzer does not offer any useful criteria for 
determining community, the very issue that federalism renders problematic. Thus, even if one 
agrees that external nations should not interfere with a community on human rights grounds, his 
argument does not provide any useful guidance on the issue being addressed. 
 73 See supra pp. 206–07. 
 74 Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 
(1995) [hereinafter Buchanan, Federalism]. For Professor Buchanan’s other discussions of plebi-
scites, see BUCHANAN, supra note 55, at 373–79; ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MO-
RALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 70–74 (1991) 
[hereinafter BUCHANAN, SECESSION]. 
 75 Buchanan, Federalism, supra note 74, at 56 (emphasis omitted). For a similar argument, 
see Donald L. Horowitz, Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law, in ETHNICITY AND 
GROUP RIGHTS 421, 431 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).  
 76 Buchanan, Federalism, supra note 74, at 56. He concludes: “International recognition of a 
presumptive right of federal units to secede, in the absence of other substantive conditions for the 
ascription of the right to secede, therefore, can serve to block the emergence of federal systems or 
distort the policies of those that already exist.” Id. Again, this does not quite address the topic of 
this article, which is whether federalism makes intervention more justifiable, but it seems to be a 
fair extension of Professor Buchanan’s point to assume that he would be skeptical of such a possi-
bility. 
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does not discuss the issue of intervention explicitly,77 one can assume that 
the situation he envisions would arise, as it did in the Sudan, because exter-
nal nations were inducing or compelling the subject nation to conduct the 
plebiscite in question. 
Viewed in pragmatic terms, Buchanan’s argument seems to rest on an 
overly sanguine understanding of federalism. Although the virtues of federal-
ism are regularly celebrated by the U.S. Supreme Court and various schol-
ars,78 it is in fact unlikely that any central government would voluntarily em-
brace true federalism. As noted above, all the policy advantages that are as-
serted to derive from federalism can be achieved by decentralization.79 The 
central government will only accept federalism, which requires that it relin-
quish partial control over some region or regions of the nation, in order to 
avoid an even less appealing alternative, such as a total loss of control. In 
such a serious situation, the future possibility of a compelled plebiscite may 
not be much of an additional disincentive. 
As a normative matter, however, Buchanan’s point seems more con-
vincing. Federalism represents a real concession by the central government 
and an effort to recognize a sub-region’s insistent demands. It seems odd to 
conclude that a nation that makes this effort should be more rather than less 
subject to outside intervention. In the end, therefore, no clear normative 
conclusion can be derived from the federal character of the nation in ques-
tion. Because it recognizes or concedes the subunit’s separate political iden-
tity, federalism suggests that intervention might be more readily justified, 
but because it represents a significant concession to that separate identity by 
the national government, it suggests the opposite. This inability to derive 
any clear normative conclusion from a nation’s federal character is not sur-
prising. Federalism, as argued above, is not a normative principle but a 
pragmatic arrangement, a means of resolving identity conflicts within a pol-
ity. Its role in international relations, therefore, is to be found in this prag-
matic realm. 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Theoretical discussions of international intervention in secession crises do not seem to have 
been as prevalent as discussions of its role in humanitarian crises, at least in recent scholarship. 
For examples, see Allen Buchanan, The International Institutional Dimension of Secession, in  
THEORIES OF SECESSION, supra note 35, at 227; Diane Orentlicher, International Responses to 
Separatist Claims: Are Democratic Principles Relevant?, in MACEDO & BUCHANAN, SECESSION 
AND SELF-DETERMINATION 19 (2003) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Are Democratic Principles Rele-
vant?]; CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, A THEORY OF SECESSION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL 
SELF-DETERMINATION 157–80 (2005); and Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: Interna-
tional Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (1998) [hereinafter Orent-
licher, Separation Anxiety]. 
 78 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 452 (1991) (federalism increases public par-
ticipation, achieves economic efficiency, allows citizen choice, and encourages experimentation); 
BEER, supra note 15 (citing scholarly sources). 
 79 See supra pp. 201–04; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 17, at 20–29. 
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Once a nation’s sovereignty has been breached in order to provide hu-
manitarian relief, which appears to represent at least a trend if not a devel-
oping consensus,80 it seems difficult not to view other questions about in-
tervention in terms of balancing the importance of sovereignty against the 
urgency of the problem, rather than as a matter of inviolate principle. In 
striking this balance, the ability of the intervening nation or nations to pro-
duce a practical and lasting resolution to the problem is a major considera-
tion,81 as the United States learned to its sorrow with its counterinsurgency 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.82 Humanitarian intervention can be effec-
tive in preventing or alleviating an immediate crisis, even if no long-term 
solution is achieved, but intervention to resolve on-going problems of hu-
man rights or self-determination is likely to produce nothing but disruption 
and resentment unless it can achieve some sort of structural resolution.83 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See World Summit Outcome, supra note 2; Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International 
Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 12, at 130; Evans, supra note 2, at 223–41; Thomas M. Franck, 
Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 12, at 204; Nicholas Onuf, 
Intervention for the Common Good, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note 12, at 43; Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in HU-
MANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 12, at 84. 
 81 See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE AGE 
OF SMALL WARS 14–15 (2013). Sitaraman argues that the intervening nation should adopt a “pro-
gressive” strategy, which attempts to “gain the trust, obligation, and support of the population.” Id. 
at 8. This approach relies on legal regularity that “embrace[s] the mutual interdependence of every 
aspect of local life.” Id. at 14–15. Leonard Doob adopts a related perspective, using the model of 
the helping professions to argue that intervention should be regarded as a form of problem solving. 
See DOOB, supra note 40, at 63–67. Doob assumes that intervention is normatively acceptable, 
which is admittedly a less controversial claim for an individual voluntarily consulting a therapist 
than it is for a nation that is subject to military action. Having done so, however, he proceeds to 
the useful notion that the intervention must be designed to provide a lasting solution to the prob-
lem that has motivated it. Id. at 63–67. 
 82 See HEHIR, supra note 12, at 247–50; ERIC HERRING & GLEN RANGWALA, IRAQ IN FRAG-
MENTS: THE OCCUPATION AND ITS LEGACY (2006); DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUE-
RILLA: FIGHTING SMALL WARS IN THE MIDST OF A BIG ONE 264–78 (2009); DOUGLAS PORCH, 
COUNTERINSURGENCY: EXPOSING THE MYTHS OF THE NEW WAY OF WAR 289–316 (2013); 
THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 3 (2006); RORY 
STEWART, THE PRINCE OF THE MARSHES: AND OTHER OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS OF A YEAR IN 
IRAQ 6 (2006); see also TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING 
AND A HISTORY DENIED 9 (2003) (failure of prior nation-building efforts). For an argument that 
these concerns should limit the President to two-year-long involvement in foreign engagements 
unless the action is specifically authorized by Congress, see Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, 
Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
447 (2011). Both these efforts are probably better regarded as regime change than as counterin-
surgency or human rights protection, despite Bush Administration statements to the contrary, and 
will be discussed in that context. See infra pp. 228–29. But the need for a long-term solution is 
crucial in justifying those lesser interventions as well, as the examples seem too salient to ignore. 
 83 See EVANS, supra note 2, at 148–74; GIBBS, supra note 61, at 10–14; TERRY, supra note 
12, at 219–21 (arguing that humanitarian intervention generally fails and tends to produce large 
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Federalism is precisely that sort of structural resolution. As a compro-
mise between subordination and secession, it allows a subunit of the nation 
partial autonomy. It thus provides a measure of protection for the group 
whose rights or sense of self-determination has been violated but avoids the 
disruption that would result from dismembering the nation.84 Moreover, it 
renders the subsequent treatment of the group by the central government 
more visible, both in political terms, because the group has been given its 
own governmental voice, and in juridical terms, because real federalism 
involves rights that can be enforced, typically by a constitutional court. As a 
result, it is easier for the external nations that originally intervened to moni-
tor the subsequent treatment of the group that they were trying to protect. 
As a long-term solution, federalism offers additional advantages in 
terms of both the impact on the subject nation and the behavior or motiva-
tion of the intervening nation. Being partial, the level of autonomy federal-
ism provides can be calibrated or adjusted to respond to the particular prob-
lems in the subject nation that triggered the intervention.85 For example, the 
relevant issues in Belgium and Canada have been linguistic,86 rather than 
                                                                                                                           
numbers of refugees who are condemned to live in camps for extended periods). Imposing a con-
stitution and then departing without further effort is likely to produce few real effects, and can be 
viewed largely as an attempt to conceal an abdication of responsibility. See Noah Feldman, Im-
posed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 873 (2005). 
 84 On secession generally, see VIVA ONA BARTKUS, THE DYNAMIC OF SECESSION (Steve 
Smith et al. eds., 1999); BUCHANAN, SECESSION, supra note 74; LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: 
THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION: NORMATIVE 
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Bruno Coppieters et al. eds., 2003); MACEDO & BU-
CHANAN, supra note 77; SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Ralph R. 
Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & Alan B. Anderson, eds., 1990); GNANAPALA 
WELHENGAMA, MINORITIES’ CLAIMS: FROM AUTONOMY TO SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND STATE PRACTICE 112 (2000); and Philpott, supra note 55, at 362. There is general agreement 
that secession, whether justified or not, is disruptive and dangerous. 
 85 For the contrary view, see Kymlicka, supra note 35, at 137–38. Part of Kymlicka’s argu-
ment is that American federalism has not been able to grant autonomy rights to ethnic minorities 
such as Indian tribes or non-English speaking overseas territories such as Puerto Rico. See id. The 
short answer here is that the United States is not truly federal. See FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERAL-
ISM, supra note 17, at 96–123; Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, supra 
note 21, at 1049–63; Rubin & Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra note 
17, at 944–48. Thus, its inability to use federalism in a situation where it might be appropriate is 
no surprise. In situations where it is more relevant, such as Quebec, Kymlicka argues that the 
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comfortable with the central government will produce irresolvable tensions. Kymlicka, supra note 
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 86 See KEITH G. BANTING ET AL., THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 120 (R. Kent Weaver ed., 
1992); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 248–56 
(1995) (Quebec); JAN ERK, EXPLAINING FEDERALISM: STATE, SOCIETY AND CONGRUENCE IN 
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND 31–56 (2008); JOHN FITZMAURICE, 
THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: A UNIQUE FEDERALISM (1996); THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: INSTI-
TUTIONS AND POLICY UNDER BIPOLAR AND CENTRIFUGAL FEDERALISM 15–20 (Marleen Brans et 
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religious, since the Belgians are nearly all Catholic and the Canadians are 
generally a mixture. In contrast, religion has loomed large in the internal 
conflicts in Nigeria and Côte D’Ivoire, but language has been less of an is-
sue, because the religiously defined communities each speak a mixture of 
languages and agree on the use of the colonial language, English and 
French respectively, as their common tongue.87 This suggests that the clear-
est grants of autonomy to the subunits in these cases should involve linguis-
tic practices in Belgium and Canada, but religious practices in Nigeria and 
Côte D’Ivoire. The situation in Somalia is currently too fluid to permit de-
finitive conclusions, but it would appear that one region, Somaliland, and 
perhaps a second, Puntland, have managed to avoid the anarchy that has 
gripped the remainder of the nation by establishing semi-autonomous re-
gimes.88 It is unclear whether the possibility that such regimes would be 
established served as the basis for the humanitarian intervention of the 
1990s;89 in any event, this basis has since been overlaid by counterinsur-
gency intervention designed to achieve regime change.90 
Treating federalism as a pragmatic remedy, rather than an initial justi-
fication, also resolves the problem that Buchanan raises.91 This approach 
would not create perverse incentives—that is, it would not use a nation’s 
adoption of federalism as an invitation or justification for intervening and 
thereby discourage nations from adopting federalism in the first place. If 
federalism is treated as a remedy, the subject nation’s prior adoption of it 
would have no effect on the decision to intervene.92 What would matter is 
                                                                                                                           
al. eds., 2009); KENNETH MCROBERTS, QUEBEC: SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CRISIS 139 
(3d ed. 1993); Kymlicka, supra note 35, at 116–19 (Quebec). 
 87 See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 34, at 110–80 (Nigeria); MIKE MCGOVERN, MAKING 
WAR IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 10–13 (2011); MEREDITH, supra note 34, at 193–205 (Nigeria), 678–79 
(Côte d’Ivoire); ST. JORRE, supra note 61, at 15–16 (Nigeria); UWECHUE, supra note 34, at 49–68 
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 88 CONFLICT AND PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: FEDERALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
114–123 (Peter Woodward & Murray Forsyth eds., 1994); JAMES FERGUSSON, THE WORLD’S 
MOST DANGEROUS PLACE: INSIDE THE OUTLAW STATE OF SOMALIA 181–281 (2013). 
 89 Regarding this intervention generally, see HIRSH & OAKLEY, supra note 49; RUTHERFORD, 
supra note 49; and Natsios, supra note 49. 
 90 See ELMI, supra note 30, at 89; FERGUSSON, supra note 88, at 25–56; MARY HARPER, 
GETTING SOMALIA WRONG? FAITH, WAR AND HOPE IN A SHATTERED STATE 170–91 (2012); 
infra pp. 228–29. 
 91 Buchanan, Federalism, supra note 74. 
 92 In his more extensive consideration of self-determination and secession, see BUCHANAN, 
SECESSION, supra note 74, Buchanan argues for recognition of the right to secede in international 
law when secession is a response to extensive human rights violations or the unjust taking of an-
other nation’s territory. He repeats this argument in BUCHANAN, supra note 55, at 353–57, giving 
as an example of the former the treatment of East Pakistan by West Pakistan, and of the latter the 
Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic States after World War II. Id. at 357. But he also discusses 
a third situation: “serious and persisting violations of intrastate autonomy agreements by the state, 
as determined by a suitable international monitoring inquiry.” Id. It is not quite clear from the 
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whether, once the intervention had been carried out, federalism could be 
imposed as a long-term structural resolution. The decision to federalize the 
subject nation would be made by the intervener, presumably in consultation 
with the people it had intervened to protect. But it would not depend on the 
previous decision of the subject nation, whose judgment and treatment of 
the potentially federalized sub-group or groups had been discounted by the 
intervener at the beginning of the process. 
In addition to its advantages for resolving the situation in the subject 
nation, a long-term federal solution also has the advantage of constraining 
the behavior of the intervening nation. Some nations might be tempted to 
intervene in the affairs of others to benefit from the dissolution of the sub-
ject nation into its component parts.93 Other nations would justifiably fear 
such interventions and adopt defensive or preemptive measures that would 
exacerbate international tensions. It is these sorts of concerns that have led 
to the principle of recognition, which holds that even existing arrangements 
of dubious or improper origin should be recognized as valid.94 For example, 
the division of Africa by the 1884 Berlin West Africa Congress was carried 
out by oppressive colonial powers, ignored issues of political identity, histo-
ry and culture, and paid scant attention to the economic viability of the enti-
ties that were created,95 but the African states that succeeded these colonial 
regimes have generally maintained their prior boundaries and opposed ef-
forts to rearrange them.96 
The pragmatic advantages that might tempt a nation to intervene and 
dissolve another nation are much weaker if the intervening nation were only 
imposing federalism as a solution. To begin with, nations are less likely to be 
motivated by a desire to eliminate an economic rival if the solution is to fed-
                                                                                                                           
discussion whether violation of such “intrastate autonomy agreements” (presumably equivalent to 
genuine federalism) would only constitute international law violations if the agreements were 
imposed as a remedy for the previously mentioned situations, i.e., extensive human rights viola-
tions or unjust conquest. Id. If so, then this third condition is simply supportive of the first two. If 
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ognized right to secede. See id. at 358–59. 
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note 2, at 143–44; CHARLES GUTHRIE & MICHAEL QUINLAN, JUST WAR: THE JUST WAR TRADI-
TION: ETHICS IN MODERN WARFARE 24–26 (2007). 
 94 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89–98 (7th ed. 2008). 
 95 See BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY 283–301, 330–37 (rev. ed. 1991); ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST 84–87 (1998); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR 
AFRICA: WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912, at 239–55 
(1991). 
 96 DAVIDSON, supra note 95, at 330–37; JOHN HATCH, A HISTORY OF POSTWAR AFRICA 
169–207 (1965). See generally BASIL DAVIDSON, supra note 34 (imposition of European nation-
state model on African independence movements has disserved African interests). 
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eralize the subject nation rather than to dissolve it. Federalism may not make 
a nation stronger economically, as its most enthusiastic proponents claim,97 
but it does not necessarily make the nation weaker, or at least not by enough 
of a margin to motivate so dangerous a policy as intervention. Nor is the in-
tervening nation as likely to benefit in political terms from imposing a federal 
regime. It cannot gain a new ally or client as it might if it dissolved the nation 
into smaller entities, and the friendlier relations it might have with the newly 
federalized subunit might be more than counterbalanced by the increased dis-
trust or hostility of the still-controlling central government. 
The final step along the continuum involves interventions to effectuate 
a complete change in the subject nation’s regime, either to protect human 
rights or to combat terrorism. There does not appear to be any justification 
in international law for employing this level of intervention to protect hu-
man rights,98 and its use to prevent terrorism is a matter of current debate.99 
A realist approach to international relations, however, must acknowledge 
that regime-changing intervention is actually quite common. It was a par-
ticular feature of the Cold War, for obvious reasons,100 but the end of that 
great power rivalry has not eliminated it, as recent U.S. and Western Euro-
pean actions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Panama, and Soma-
lia demonstrate.101 The question for this inquiry is whether the federalized 
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TRAINOR, THE ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ, FROM GEORGE W. 
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character of the subject nation would make this questionable, but common 
mode of intervention more justified, or less unjustified, either in general or 
because it provided a potential long-term resolution to the ground for inter-
vention. 
The answer must be no. The goal of these most extreme interventions 
is to change the regime in its entirety, without regard to its internal struc-
ture. The reason the United States intervened in Chile and Guatemala, for 
example, was because of its concerns that the governments that had come to 
power were inclined toward communism, not because they were treating 
their native american populations unfairly or discriminating in favor of one 
region and against another.102 The reason it intervened in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Somalia was to protect itself from actual or perceived threats to its own 
security.103 The concern in these situations is the nature of the central re-
gime itself, not the way that the central regime allocates authority among 
the different regions or demographic components of the nation. No level of 
federalism could have saved the regimes in Chile, Guatemala, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq from the American hostility that they had engendered by their 
overall political orientation. 
Federalism might be relevant as a solution for all the reasons stated 
above with respect to interventions designed to protect human rights or se-
cure self-determination. It can be argued that a nation should not displace 
another nation’s political regime unless it believes it can impose a better 
one. Arguably, both Iraq and Somalia now include federalized subunits as a 
result of the various regime-changing interventions to which they have been 
subject.104 Future settlements in Syria and Libya might also involve auton-
                                                                                                                           
BUSH TO BARACK OBAMA 1–8 (2012); JOHN KEEGAN, THE IRAQ WAR (2004); ALISON PARGET-
ER, LIBYA: THE RISE AND FALL OF QADAFFI 214–47 (2012); ORDER AND DISORDER AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 154 (Brad Roberts ed., 1995); KARIN VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRACY BY FORCE: US MILI-
TARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (2000) (discussing Panama, Somalia, 
Haiti, and Bosnia). 
 102 See TANYA HARMER, ALLENDE’S CHILE AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COLD WAR 90 
(2011); STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE STORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 99–101 (rev. ed. 2005); RALPH LEE WOODWARD, JR., A SHORT HIS-
TORY OF GUATEMALA 136–42 (2005). 
 103 See ELMI, supra note 30, at 73–89; GORDON & TRAINER, supra note 101; HERRING & 
RANGWALA, supra note 82, at 260; SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA’S 
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 86–150 (2010); KEEGAN, supra note 101; PORCH, supra note 9, at 289–
316; RICKS, supra note 82, at 3. The intervention in Somalia discussed here is the counterinsur-
gency effort of the twenty-first century, as opposed to the humanitarian effort of the 1990s, see 
supra note 89. This counterinsurgency has actually been carried out by Ethiopian troops, and more 
recently by the African Union (AMISOM) with troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Uganda, see ELMI, supra note 30, at 73–107; FERGUSSON, supra note 88, at 29–56, 64, but as 
Elmi notes, the Ethiopian effort was at least supported, if not initiated, by the United States. 
 104 CONFLICT AND PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: FEDERALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES, 
supra note 88; FERGUSSON, supra note 88, at 181–281; Liam Anderson & Gareth Stansfield, The 
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omous subunits covering some or all of the nation. But the argument that 
federal solutions justify regime-change intervention should be viewed with 
skepticism. When a nation decides to undertake regime change, it is neces-
sarily claiming that the existing regime, in its entirety, is so objectionable or 
threatening that it should be entirely eliminated. Such a strong claim needs 
to be justified on its own terms because it asserts, in effect, that anything 
would be better than the existing regime. To take an extreme example, the 
Allies’ decision to invade Nazi Germany was not truly based on the availa-
bility of any particular alternative regime. That would also appear to be true 
for the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. One might question the 
accuracy or the sincerity of the Bush Administration’s claim that Iraq pos-
sessed weapons of mass destruction. That would lead to the conclusion that 
the invasion was unjustified. But if one assumes that the invasion was justi-
fiable on the asserted ground, the availability of a particular replacement 
regime would not seem to contribute very much to the justification. 
It might be argued that a nation could invade another nation in order to 
impose federalism per se. But this logical possibility is unlikely to occur in 
any real-world situation. Federalism, as discussed above, is an instrumentality 
designed to deal with certain features of political entity, almost always differ-
ences in political identity among its citizens. It is not an ideology, like democ-
racy, capitalism, communism, Catholicism, or Protestantism, to which nations 
are committed and which motivates their most basic foreign policy decisions. 
It is sometimes said that federalism protects liberty.105 Therefore, it 
might be regarded as an important or even necessary element of democracy, 
and thus a basis for recent interventions by the United States and other 
Western nations, which have tended to regard the imposition of democratic 
government as a major reason for intervention in the post-Cold War era.106 
But the connection between federalism and liberty is an essentially rhetori-
cal assertion by those who favor federalism for other reasons. 107 As an em-
                                                                                                                           
Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model, 35 PUBLIUS 359, 
368 (2005); Dawn Brancati, Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?, 27 WASH. Q. 7, 20 (2004); Sean 
Kane et al., Iraq’s Federalism Quandry, 118 NAT’L INT. 20, 20, 22 (2012); Kanan Makiya, A 
Model for Post-Saddam Iraq, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 22 (2003). 
 105 See BEER, supra note 15, at 386–88; Baker & Young, supra note 23, at 136–39; Miller, 
supra note 15. 
 106 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 55, at 314–22; VON HIPPEL, supra note 101; Franck, 
supra note 59; Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety, supra note 77. 
 107 There are also grounds for opposing intervention on this basis, of course. See Robert H. 
Jackson, International Community Beyond the Cold War, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOV-
EREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note 12, at 59, 72–74 (arguing that inter-
vention is intrinsically antithetical to democracy, and thus that democracy is a particularly un-
promising goal for interventionist efforts); MILL, supra note 71 (same); Walzer, supra note 69, at 
210 (nations should be left to resolve their own problems except in cases of egregious abuse). As 
Jackson says, “[i]f democracy is becoming an international norm [in the post-Cold War era], then 
228 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:195 
pirical matter, some of the nations with the very best human rights records, 
such as, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden, are unitary regimes.108 
There is simply no coherent definition of political liberty that would deny 
that description to these regimes and confer it on federalized democracies 
such as Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Mexico.109 As a matter of theory, feder-
alism only protects the partial autonomy of a nation’s geographical subu-
nits. The subunits may use their autonomy to either enlarge or restrict the 
rights that its inhabitants would otherwise possess as citizens of the nation. 
Nothing in the nature of federalism itself tells us which will be the case. 
Similarly, the central government of a nation that employs federalism as its 
means of internal organization can be either solicitous or dismissive of indi-
vidual rights. Again, there is nothing in the grant of autonomy to geograph-
ical subunits that can tell us what its stance on this subject will be. In short, 
if one nation seeks regime change in another in order to impose a democrat-
ic system, the federal nature of the subject nation, either before or after the 
intervention, will not be a significant factor in its decision to intervene. 
C. Federalism as a Structural Remedy 
Having concluded that federalism has one identifiable and important 
role in justifying intervention by one nation against another—namely, as a 
                                                                                                                           
we should expect that even fewer acts of international intervention would be justifiable than was 
the case previously.” Jackson, supra, at 73. The recent American experience in Iraq would seem to 
confirm this observation. See DODGE, supra note 82; HEHIR, supra note 12, at 221–40; HERRING 
& RANGWALA, supra note 82, at 260; RICKS, supra note 82. But there are countervailing exam-
ples as well, such as the U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II, see JOHN W. 
DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II (1999); EDWARD M. 
MARTIN, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (1948); EDWARD N. PETERSON, THE AMERICAN 
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: RETREAT TO VICTORY (1977); FREDERICK TAYLOR, EXORCISING 
HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY (2011), and the more recent 
intervention in Panama, VON HIPPEL, supra note 101, at 27–54. Von Hippel proposes some crite-
ria for making more modulated judgments about the possibilities of imposing democracy via re-
gime change. VON HIPPEL, supra note 101, at 168–206. 
 108 In the Freedom House rankings for the two categories of Political Rights and Civil Liber-
ties, all these nations received the highest score, a “1” in both categories. See Freedom in the 
World 2017: Table of Scores, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-
country-scores [https://perma.cc/37CU-4HXU]. With respect to freedom of the press (180 nations 
ranked from most to least free), the four unitary nations in the text were ranked 52, 72, 5, and 2, 
respectively, and all were designated “Free.” See Freedom of the Press 2016: Table of Scores, 
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2016/table-country-scores-fotp-
2016 [https://perma.cc/FSH3-F3B2]. 
 109 Freedom House scored Brazil 2 and 2 in Political Rights and Civil Liberties, while India 
scored 2 and 3. Malaysia scored 4 and 4, and Mexico scored 3 and 3, with both being character-
ized as only “Partly Free.” See Freedom in the World 2017: Table of Scores, supra note 108. For 
freedom of the press, India was 136 (Partly Free), Brazil was 103 (Partly Free), Mexico was 147 
(Not Free), and Malaysia was 144 (Not Free). See Freedom of the Press 2016: Table of Scores, 
supra note 108. 
2017] The Role of Federalism in International Law 229 
promising long-term solution when the intervention is based on violations 
of human rights, self-determination, and perhaps the need for regime 
change—the next step in the inquiry is to consider that role in greater detail. 
To begin with, federalism has several significant limitations as a long-term 
structural solution. The first is that, as described above, it is only applicable 
to groups of people who are geographically concentrated.110 If the people 
who appeal to external nations on the grounds that their rights are being 
violated are scattered throughout the subject nation, federalism does not offer 
any pragmatic assistance in fashioning a long-term solution. One might ap-
peal to other types of solutions, like the consociational structure championed 
by Arend Lijphart, which permits groups participating in central government 
decision-making to share power and exercise limited autonomy.111 Democ-
racy itself may provide a structural solution, even if it is not the basis of the 
intervention. But the effect of federalism on questions of international inter-
vention is limited to protecting the human rights or self-determination of 
geographically concentrated groups. 
A second limitation results from the awkward empirical fact that even 
geographically concentrated groups are rarely the exclusive inhabitants of 
their region. Any region around which a boundary is drawn for the purpose 
of granting the residents autonomy rights such as control over language, 
family law, or an established religion will likely include significant num-
bers of people who do not identify with the dominant group in the region.112 
They may be a smaller minority within the region, or they may be members 
of the national majority who constitute a minority within that more limited 
domain. The first possibility is quite common, given the diversity, complex-
ity, and mobility of human groups, while the second is virtually inevitable, 
given the tendency of the dominant group to spread throughout the nation’s 
boundaries. From the perspectives of these minorities, particularly the sec-
ond type, federalism may be preferable to secession, but that does obviate 
the fact that it creates serious difficulties. Any long-term solution should 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See sources cited supra note 35.  
 111 See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORA-
TION 25–52 (1977); AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 30–45 (2012). As he explains: 
“Power-sharing means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political 
decision-making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have 
authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in areas of education and culture.” Arend 
Lijphart, The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CON-
STITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 37, 39 (Andrew Reynolds 
ed., 2002). 
 112 See Allen Buchanan, The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy, Minority Rights and the 
Rule of Law, in  THEORIES OF SECESSION, supra note 35, at 238, 254–55; WILL KYMLICKA, MUL-
TICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 10–33 (1995); Arend Li-
jphart, Self-Determination Versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Sys-
tems, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS, supra note 75, at 275. 
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provide for the protection of minorities within the federalized area to com-
bat the inevitable enthusiasm of the regionally dominant group to impose 
uniformity in support of its newly granted autonomy. 
A further consideration is whether the particular basis for intervention, 
within the general area of human rights and self-determination, suggests 
additional limitations. Thus far, all human rights violations and violations of 
self-determination have been treated together. Does federalism provide a 
superior justification for intervention based on the kind of human rights that 
are being violated, or on the type of group whose self-determination is be-
ing secured? There are so many variations to these questions that the an-
swers can only be offered on a preliminary basis. Even so, these answers 
provide further illumination regarding the role of federalism with respect to 
definitive interventions. 
The standard approach in human rights theory is to distinguish among 
first generation (or negative) rights, which protect people against specific 
government oppressions; second generation (or positive) rights, which grant 
people specific entitlements such as subsistence, health care, or education; 
and third generation (or group) rights, which grant communities protections 
or benefits that extend beyond those granted to any of its members as indi-
viduals.113 As an initial matter, the extent to which human rights violations 
can justify intervention would seem to depend on the degree of consensus 
regarding the rights in question. Negative rights are the best established; 
they have long been recognized in Western society114 and are currently con-
troversial only at their margins.115 Second generation rights are more con-
troversial, but figure prominently in the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of 
                                                                                                                           
 113 The classic distinction between positive and negative rights is Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts 
of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). 
 114 The origins of negative rights are often traced back to the Middle Ages. See Arthur Ste-
phen McGrade, Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights, in AUTHORITY AND POWER: STUDIES 
ON MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN ON HIS SEVENTIETH 
BIRTHDAY 149, 149–53 (Brian Tierney & Peter Linehan eds., 1980); ARTHUR STEPHEN 
MCGRADE, Rights, Natural Rights, and the Philosophy of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LATER MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM THE REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE TO THE DISINTEGRA-
TION OF SCHOLASTICISM 1100–1600, at 738, 738–42 (Norman Kretzmann et al. eds., 1982); BRI-
AN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW 
AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, at 28–29, 343 (1997); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEO-
RIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 5–7 (1979). Other scholars argue that rights originated in 
the early modern period, see C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDI-
VIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263–69 (1962), or the Enlightenment, see LYNN AVERY HUNT, 
INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 26–32 (2007); Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human 
Rights, 9 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 5, 8 (2003). 
 115 Universal Declaration, supra note 50. Articles 2 to 21 articulate a full set of negative 
rights, including a few that might be regarded at the outer edge of this concept, such as the right to 
asylum in Article 14. 
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Human Rights116 and its supplemental International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)117 to which most nations in the world 
are signatory.118 In addition, they appear in most modern constitutions119 
and are strongly endorsed by many scholars.120 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Universal Declaration, supra note 50. Articles 22 to 26 specifically affirm positive rights: 
the right to social security, the right to employment, the right to rest and leisure, the right to health 
and well-being, and the right to an education. Article 25 reads: “Everyone has the right to a stand-
ard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security.” Id. art. 
25. 
 117 ICESCR, supra note 50, reiterates these second generation rights, see id. art. 11 (recogniz-
ing “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing”); id. art. 12 (recognizing “the right of everyone to the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”); id. art. 13 (recognizing 
“the right of everyone to education”), and at least gestures at third generation rights, although 
from an individual rights perspective, see id. art. 15 (recognizing “the right of everyone . . . to take 
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 118 The United States is a significant exception, having declined to ratify the ICESCR. See 
Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The 
Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (1990); Ann M. Piccard, The 
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around the world, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE 
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21–26 (1991) (examining the democratization of Latin America and 
Asia after the 1970s); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 864, 868–72 (1986) (discussing the German constitution); and Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in 
Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521–29 (1992). The South African 
constitution of 1996, which has received particular attention, contains the following provisions: 
Article 24, the right to a healthful environment; Article 26, the “right to have access to adequate 
housing;” Article 27, rights to “have access to (a) health care services, including reproductive 
health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security;” and Article 29, the right to 
education. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 24, 26, 27, 29; see Richard J. Goldstone, A South African 
Perspective on Social and Economic Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 4–6 (2006); Mark S. Kende, 
The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137, 142–47 (2003). 
 120 See DONNELLY, supra note 45, at 30–31; WILLIAM F. FELICE, TAKING SUFFERING SERI-
OUSLY: THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 144 (1996); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HU-
MAN RIGHTS 12, 96 (2008); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HU-
MAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 20–21 (2d ed. 2003); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 111 (2d ed. 2007); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 35–53 (2d ed. 1996). For arguments that such rights should be recognized as 
being required by the U.S. Constitution, see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2346–47 (1990); Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitu-
tion, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 407–08 (1966); William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Differ-
ent from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1771, 1771–73 (1994); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A 
Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 412–13 (1990); 
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional 
Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 
Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. 
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The problem, in both cases, is that denials of these rights frequently 
lack drama. Unless they are extreme, they represent contested political ar-
rangements within the nation that are difficult to articulate as a basis of de-
finitive intervention. Free speech is perhaps the best known negative right, 
for example, but all governments place some restrictions on speech; at what 
point can these restrictions be regarded as so severe that they justify even an 
embargo, to say nothing of an invasion? Similarly, subsistence and health 
care seem crucial for even a minimally acceptable human existence, but 
treating these needs as rights runs into the common objection that they de-
pend on the availability of resources. At what point can the failure to pro-
vide them be regarded as a violation that triggers intervention, as opposed 
to a misfortunate that merits voluntary assistance? 
The most compelling circumstance probably involves a deprivation fo-
cused on a single group within the nation. This will often have the character 
of a conscious effort to oppress, rather than a general political condition in the 
case of first generation rights or a general shortage of resources in the case of 
second generation rights. It overlaps with circumstances where federalism, 
although it does not provide an initial justification for intervention, offers a 
pragmatic remedy that possesses justificatory force. From this perspective, 
second generation rights, while more controversial generally, appear to pro-
vide a better case for intervention because their denial serves as a basis for 
humanitarian aid. Denial of sustenance or health care can cause threats to life 
that generally would not occur in the case of first generation rights. 
The significance of groups in identifying the effects of federalism on 
potential interventions directs attention to third generation rights, which 
attach to groups, rather than individuals.121 These include a group’s right to 
preserve its culture, to transact business and provide education in its lan-
guage, and to be protected against efforts to assimilate it into a national ma-
jority. A number of United Nations treaties and declarations have recog-
nized group rights to some extent,122 and scholars have provided both theo-
                                                                                                                           
REV. 7, 9–11 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 659–60 (1979); and Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution 
Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005). 
 121 For general discussions, see DONNELLY, supra note 120, at 204–24; FELICE, supra note 
120, at 1–3; GRIFFIN, supra note 120, at 256–76; Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Concerning 
Collective Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 202, 202–23 (Will Kymlicka ed., 
1995); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self-
Preservation, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra, at 179; and KYMLICKA, supra note 
112, at 1, 35. 
 122 U.N. Charter arts. 13, 55, 57, 73; ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 27; Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into 
force Jan. 12, 1951). 
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retical justifications and pragmatic prescriptions.123 But the contours of the 
rights that the U.N. has articulated remain decidedly unclear, while other 
scholars argue that political rights attach only to individuals and that group 
rights are an incoherent or inadvisable idea. 124 
There appears to be a close link between group rights and federalism, 
much closer than between individual rights and federalism. Federalism, af-
ter all, refers to groups, not individuals. Just as no individual can assert a 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989) (arguing 
that liberalism, despite claims by critics such as Sandel and Taylor, recognizes the individual’s 
membership in communities and only rejects more extreme communitarian claims that should in 
fact be rejected); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MI-
NORITY RIGHTS (1995) (arguing that group rights that protect the group from political and eco-
nomic domination by the larger society should be recognized, but that group rights that restrict the 
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racy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its Impact on American Indian Tribes, 
27 POL. STUD. 421 (1979) (discussing the challenge that group rights claims pose for liberal dem-
ocratic theory, as exemplified by the conflict between American democracy and the communalism 
of Native American tribes); Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities 
in Political Theory, 29 WORLD POL. 343 (1977) (asserting that groups have rights that should be 
recognized, including a moral right to self-determination); Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: 
For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607 (1975) (arguing that Rawls’ liberalism is based on the 
factually incorrect assumption that society is an ethnically homogenous state); Vernon Van Dyke, 
Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 725 (1974) (observing that, although 
the U.N. Charter recognizes only individual rights, many collective rights of groups are recog-
nized by domestic policies and international agreements). 
 124 See, e.g., John R. Danley, Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities, 20 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF, 168 (1991) (critiquing Kymlicka for failing to account for the ability of liberalism to 
recognize culture, and for defining group rights for vulnerable aboriginal minorities in a manner 
than cannot be adequately generalized); Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985) (rejecting Sandel’s and MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism and argu-
ing that theories of communitarian rights are basically flawed); H. N. Hirsch, The Threnody of 
Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423 (1986) 
(critiquing communitarian scholars for failing to recognize the conditions needed to create and 
maintain communities, the negative consequences of these conditions, and the inconsistency of 
these conditions with American constitutionalism); Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural 
Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992) (arguing that the liberal theory of individual rights, in pro-
tecting minorities against the majority, provides all the protection for groups that is required, so 
that there is no need to resort to a separate theory of group rights); Jeremy Waldron, Minority 
Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992) (arguing for the 
moral and pragmatic value of universal rights, economic interdependence, and cultural malleabil-
ity). Gutmann, supra, at 319, says: “The communitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not to 
believe in witches.”  
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right to speak his or her own language,125 no individual can assert a right to 
exercise governmental authority. In both cases, it is only a group or com-
munity of people who can coherently advance these claims. The result is 
that the substance of the federal solution that potentially justifies the inter-
vention can be derived from the nature of the violation, which is not neces-
sarily true where individual rights, either negative or positive, are con-
cerned. 
To clarify, if a nation intervenes to protect individual rights and impos-
es a federal solution, that solution is likely to be structured as partial auton-
omy for the region whose people were being oppressed by the central gov-
ernment. The theory is that the new, partially autonomous regional govern-
ment would treat its people better on those issues where it had decision-
making authority, and advocate for their interests more effectively on those 
issues where decision-making authority remained with the central govern-
ment. But the difference between the national and regional regimes would 
not involve human rights, per se. It seems unlikely that modern nations 
would intervene on the ground that a particular group was being denied free 
exercise of its religion, or a basic right to sustenance, and then endorse a 
solution where those rights were granted to the previously oppressed group 
and denied to the remainder of the nation’s people. But if a nation imposes 
federalism as a means of protecting group rights, it has a clearer basis for 
crafting a federal regime that grants autonomy with respect to the content of 
those particular rights, whether it is language, religion, culture, or some 
other attribute of the oppressed minority. It would make perfect sense, for 
example, to insist that a linguistic minority be granted specific rights to pro-
tect the use of its language, such as the provision of public education and 
legal services in that language, without adding any specifications regarding 
the remainder of the nation. 
This appealing symmetry between group rights and the intervention 
justified by a federalist solution is subject to some important caveats, how-
ever, beyond the limits of geographic concentration and subsidiary minori-
ties described above. Even if one is willing to accept the validity of group 
rights, it seems difficult to argue that they are of equal importance to indi-
vidual rights, of either the negative or positive variety. Considered by them-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Dénise Réaume, The Constitutional Protection of Language: Survival or Security, in 
LANGUAGE AND THE STATE 37, 48 (David Schneiderman ed., 1991); Ruth Rubio Marin, Explor-
ing the Boundaries of Language Rights: Insiders, Newcomers and Natives, in SECESSION AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 77, at 136, 144–61. Wittgenstein makes the more general point 
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trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
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selves rather than as a supplement to individual rights, they relate mainly to 
induced rather than compelled assimilation. If a group has its own language 
and its own religion, compelled assimilation of that group, by forbidding its 
members to speak their language or practice their religion, would inevitably 
violate much better-established rights of free speech and free exercise, so 
that group rights would need not be considered. A violation of group rights, 
by itself, would generally consist of non-coercive inducements to the group 
to abandon its culture, such as providing education only in the majority lan-
guage, failing to provide funding for the group’s cultural activities, or en-
couraging young people to leave the group by offering them opportunities 
in the larger society. While members of the group may perceive such ac-
tions as threats and even respond to them with violence,126 it is difficult to 
argue that adoption of such policies by a nation provides another nation 
with a justification for intervening. 
Moreover, as Will Kymlicka has pointed out,127 group rights may not 
only seem somewhat flimsy when standing by themselves, but they may 
conflict with individual rights that are generally seen as more substantial. A 
group’s culture will only persist if its young people subscribe to it, but if the 
group is a small or remote minority within the nation, its young people may 
yearn for the bright lights and broader opportunities that the majority cul-
                                                                                                                           
 126 It is precisely such a perceived threat that has fueled Islamic fundamentalism, which has 
been notoriously violent. While the fundamentalists have demonized Western culture in general 
and Western nations in particular, the driving force of their antagonism has not been that people in 
Tennessee or Shropshire are behaving in ways that they dislike, but that the governments of the 
nations where they themselves live have adopted Western culture and are inducing them, and their 
children, to behave this way. See YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: THE STO-
RY OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 157–96 (3d ed. 2010); MICHAEL FIELD, INSIDE THE ARAB WORLD 
228–71 (1995); BEVERLEY MILTON-EDWARDS, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM SINCE 1945, at 73–
113 (2005); RAPHAEL PATAI, THE ARAB MIND 294–325 (rev. ed. 2002). For a vivid discussion of 
this phenomenon in a particular country, see MARTIN STONE, THE AGONY OF ALGERIA (1997). 
Because Algeria was so intensely colonized, and its elites so strongly influenced by French cul-
ture, the fundamentalists have been particularly hostile to modernization efforts by the national 
(and entirely Islamic) post-colonial regime. “In the political and social crises of the 1990s satellite 
dishes became a frequent target for Islamic extremists in heavily Islamic-influenced areas . . . .” 
Id. at 22–23. 
 127 KYMLICKA, supra note 112, at 152–72. He says: 
[A] liberal conception of minority rights cannot accommodate all the demands of all 
minority groups. For example, some cultural minorities do not want a system of mi-
nority rights that is tied to the promotion of individual freedom or personal autono-
my . . . . These measures do not protect the group from the decisions of the larger 
society. Rather, they limit the freedom of individual members within the group to 
revise traditional practices. As such, they are inconsistent with any system of minor-
ity rights that appeals to individual freedom or personal autonomy. 
Id. at 153. For a related view, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) (arguing that a 
well-ordered liberal society consists of an overlapping consensus among different groups that do 
not necessarily share a common conception of the good or a commitment to liberalism). 
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ture offers. The group’s efforts to survive, and to resist assimilation, may 
thus involve restrictions on these young people’s freedom. Central govern-
ment policies that support those efforts may thus appear as a violation of 
these people’s rights. 
Such considerations emphasize the role of federalism as a solution ra-
ther than a ground for intervention. It is difficult to regard group rights as a 
basis for external intervention, even if an already federalized subunit ap-
peals to the international community for support and protection. On the oth-
er hand, if external nations intervene in response to more severe humanitar-
ian or human rights concerns, additional considerations based on group 
rights can aid in crafting the federalist remedy. Federalism’s grant of partial 
autonomy to the oppressed region might specifically protect its collective or 
group rights. At the same time, the fact that the region remained part of the 
nation would provide countervailing forces in the region that might well 
protect the individual rights of those who, for reasons of political identity or 
personal preference, wanted to associate themselves with the national cul-
ture. It is precisely the ability to fine-tune the relationship between the cen-
tral and regional governments that makes federalism an attractive solution 
for nations whose peoples have disparate political identities. 
Federalism seems still more appealing as a solution for claims to self-
determination. While the principle of self-determination played an im-
portant role in the decolonization process128 and is generally uncontrover-
sial in that context, it presents more complexities as a general principle for 
determining national boundaries. One of the major criticisms is that it seems 
to imply a right to secede, and thus threatens the dismemberment of any 
nation containing populations with disparate political identities.129 This is in 
fact the way the principle was implemented by one of its strongest propo-
nents, Woodrow Wilson.130 The settlement he urged in the aftermath of 
World War I involved the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a 
collection of small, ethnically defined new nations. Unfortunately, each of 
these nations possessed ethnic minorities of their own that led to a reitera-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See CASSESE, supra note 1, at 71–98; JOHN CHARLES HATCH, A HISTORY OF POSTWAR 
AFRICA 25–41 (1965); MEREDITH, supra note 34, at 162–78. For an insightful argument that the 
principle of self-determination, when implemented in accordance with European concepts of the 
nation state, represented a disastrous strategy for African society, see BASIL DAVIDSON, supra 
note 34, at 10–13. 
 129 See BUCHANAN, supra note 55 at 331–400; BUCHHEIT, supra note 84; CASSESE, supra 
note 86, at 205–76; HANNUM, supra note 55, at 46–49; Donald Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in 
SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 77, at 50; MUSGRAVE, supra note 55, at 22–
30. 
 130 See THOMAS J. KNOCK, TO END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A 
NEW WORLD ORDER passim (1992); EREZ MANELA, THE WILSONIAN MOMENT: SELF-
DETERMINATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF ANTICOLONIAL NATIONALISM 25–26 
(2007); MUSGRAVE, supra note 55, at 22–30. 
2017] The Role of Federalism in International Law 237 
tion of the problem that the dissolution was designed to solve.131 What fol-
lowed, during the next century, was a lugubrious history that fully justified 
the comment, widely attributed to Winston Churchill, that the Balkans have 
produced more history than they can consume.132 Self-determination seems 
even more problematic if the group demanding it happens to occupy a re-
source-rich part of the nation. That represents a potential threat to the eco-
nomic viability of the remaining nation and induces the suspicion that the 
people, or at least the leadership, of the seceding region are motivated by 
greed as well as by identity politics. 
Here again, federalism can provide a workable and attractive solution, 
and thus increase the justifiability of intervening on behalf of the group 
whose political identity differs from that of its nation’s majority. Because it 
represents an intermediate step between domination and secession, federal-
ism counteracts three of the most troublesome and least justifiable motiva-
tions for the minority group to assert its right of self-determination and for 
an external nation to support that right. While federal regimes grant auton-
omy to subunits of the nation on matters connected most closely to political 
identity and culture, their central governments tend to retain control over 
the economy, civil order, and foreign relations by maintaining a national 
market, a supervisory legal system, and a unified foreign policy. The na-
tional market will oppose, or counteract, efforts by the autonomous sub-
region to monopolize or control resources that happen to be located in its 
region. The supervisory legal system will tend to provide significant protec-
tion to minority groups within the federalized subunits, particularly in the 
common case where one of those minority groups is the national majority, 
thus counteracting any instinct by the previously dominated population of 
the sub-region to be prejudiced or retaliatory. The unified foreign policy 
will deny to the intervening nation the political advantages it might gain by 
encouraging the breakup of a rival or hostile nation and then establishing 
friendly or client relations with the more tractable of the successor states. In 
other words, a federalist solution tends to shift the principle of self-
determination away from its less attractive aspects of greed, ethnocentrism, 
and international realpolitik, and toward more normatively appealing fea-
tures such as local governance and cultural diversity. 
                                                                                                                           
 131 In fact, the dissolution involved the creation of four new nations (Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), plus regions attached to Poland (which was restored by the 
settlement) and Romania. See MISHA GLENNY, THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM, WAR, AND THE 
GREAT POWERS 1804–1999, at 307–544, 634–661 (2001); ROBERT A. KAHN, A HISTORY OF THE 
HABSBURG EMPIRE 1526–1918, at 497–520 (1974). It is interesting to speculate whether the fed-
eralization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have been a preferable solution. 
 132 The largest of the newly created nations, Yugoslavia, broke apart into eight separate enti-
ties, in part as a result of further interventionist actions by the United States. See GIBBS, supra 
note 61, at 106–14. 
238 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:195 
III. EXTERNAL RESPONSE TO INVITATION 
The role of federalism in international law is not limited to the issue of 
definitive intervention into a nation’s internal affairs. There are a significant 
number of nations where such intervention could not possibly be justifiable, 
regardless of whether it is practical, and others where it could not be practi-
cal, even if justifiable.133 Some of these nations are already federal, howev-
er, and their subunits, possessing a certain level of autonomy, want to estab-
lish international relations of various kinds. They might do so by initiating 
contacts with external nations or by responding to contacts that foreign na-
tions have initiated. Alternatively, an external nation may perceive some 
specific advantages in establishing direct relations with another nation’s 
federalized subunits. Is it justifiable for an external nation to engage in con-
tacts of this sort? That is, does federalism confer some sort of international 
status on the subunits of the federalized nation, and is it justifiable for ex-
ternal nations to enter into such contacts when there is no general justifica-
tion for intervention on humanitarian, human rights, or related grounds? 
The question is not whether subunits of a nation can engage in interna-
tional contacts of any kind. It is well established that we live in a globalizing 
world and that institutions that define themselves in largely or entirely domes-
tic terms are likely to become involved in relationships that extend beyond 
the borders of their nation. Corporations, non-profit institutions, universities, 
cultural organizations, scientific organizations, professional and amateur 
sports leagues, and public institutions of various kinds will all find that they 
need to engage with institutions of the same or different kind in other coun-
tries. Generally, they will be able to do so with the tacit or explicit authoriza-
tion of the nation where they are located. Subunits of the nation that have 
their own governmental structures and pursue their own policies in particular 
areas have the same need to act in an international arena and will possess the 
same implicit authority to do so.134 The question here is whether an external 
nation is justified in establishing certain contacts with the federalized subunits 
of a nation over the explicit objection of that nation’s central government. 
That is the point at which contacts with a foreign nation become a form of 
intervention by the foreign nation and where a question of international law 
arises. 
Consider the example of Canada, which has created a federalized re-
gime, in large part in response to demands from the French-speaking popu-
                                                                                                                           
 133 This second category would consist, at a minimum, of the great powers, which, as Hedley 
Bull suggests, can be defined as those nations that cannot be intervened against.  INTERVENTION 
IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 12, at 2. 
 134 For a comprehensive discussion of such contacts, see GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 10, 
at 35–76. 
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lation of Quebec.135 Canada is a nation that protects human rights, of all 
kinds, at the highest level;136 consequently, interference with Canada’s in-
ternal affairs is impermissible.137 But the province of Quebec has now been 
granted a range of autonomy rights in Canada’s federal system and wants to 
establish international relations with foreign nations or institutions in those 
nations.138 How should other nations respond to such overtures? Should 
they require, and demand that their institutions require, permission from the 
Canadian government, or should they treat Quebec as sufficiently separate 
and autonomous to establish relations regardless of, or in opposition to, the 
policies of Canada? 
It follows, from the characterization of federalism established above, 
that external nations would not be justified in establishing relations with a 
subunit such as Quebec over the explicit objection of the national govern-
ment. To reiterate, federalism is not a deontological principle but a pragmat-
ic arrangement designed to solve certain structural problems, specifically 
the problem of divergent political identities within the populace. Thus, the 
fact that the nation has adopted federalism as a solution to a sub-optimal situ-
ation does not confer any justification to intervene on external nations.139 
There is no coherent normative claim that the external nation can advance 
that would justify intervention, even of a fairly mild nature, simply because 
the subject nation has chosen to structure its government in a particular 
way.140 Of course, the federal arrangement itself may allow the subunit to 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See generally BANTING ET AL., supra note 86 (essays discussing various features of Que-
bec’s demand for greater autonomy or independence); BUCHANAN, SECESSION, supra note 74 
(discussing Quebec’s right to secede from Canada in terms of a general theory of the right  to 
secede on the basis of a separate cultural identity); CASSESE, supra note 55, at 248–56 (same); 
ERK, supra note 86, at 44–56 (observing that Canadian federalism did not satisfy the demands of 
Quebec, which differs from other provinces because of its language, and thus the federal system 
had to be revised and adapted to account for this difference); KYMLICKA, supra note 112, at 10–-
26, 116–20 (discussing Quebec’s demands in terms of the multiethnic character of the Canadian 
nation and the historical origins of that nation); MCROBERTS, supra note 86 (recounting the histo-
ry of Quebec and its relationship to the Canadian nation during the twentieth century). 
 136 According to Freedom House, a leading international human rights organization, Canada 
has a general freedom ranking of 1.0, the highest possible on its 1 to 7 scale, and a ranking of 1 on 
both political rights and civil liberties. This has been true ever since Freedom House began its 
rankings in 1973, which is prior to the expansion of Canadian federalism. See Freedom in the 
World 2017: Table of Scores, supra note 108. 
 137 This is not to say that no injustices occur in Canada, but simply that these injustices do not 
rise to the level that would justify intervention. 
 138 At present, the province of Quebec has twenty-six international offices in fifteen separate 
countries, designated as general delegations, delegations, bureaus, and trade offices. See Offices 
Abroad, GOV’T OF QUE., http://www.mrif.gouv.qc.ca/en/ministere/representation-etranger [https://
perma.cc/UUY5-672Q]. 
 139 See supra pp. 219–22. 
 140 In the United States, this principle leads to a strong preemption doctrine, as established by 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). A recent reaffirmation is Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
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establish certain types of relationships with other nations. In that case, how-
ever, the subunit’s authority is properly regarded as a delegation by the cen-
tral government, just as that government might delegate authority to a pri-
vate entity for certain purposes. As noted at the outset, this is a question of 
domestic law, not international law.141 The issue of intervention simply does 
not arise under these circumstances. 
Federalism is not without effect in this context, however. In deciding 
whether to respond to a request from a federalized subunit, the external na-
tion is entitled to assume that the subunit has been granted the authority to 
make such a request. If the request came from a subunit of a unitary nation, 
however, the external nation would not be entitled to act on such an as-
sumption. The reason is that federalism constitutes a grant of partial auton-
omy and thus may explicitly or implicitly authorize the subunit to deal di-
rectly with external nations on certain issues. Both historical circumstances 
and the current pace of globalization suggest that the grant of autonomy 
would often be hobbled by a prohibition against any international relations 
by the federalized subunit. Quebec is surrounded, for literally thousands of 
miles, by English-speaking territory. If it could not engage in cultural ex-
changes with other Francophone areas, which inevitably consist of other 
nations or parts of other nations, the value of the language rights it has been 
granted by Canadian federalism would be diminished. Similarly, if a subunit 
has been granted authority over family law, the full exercise of that authori-
ty in the modern world would require it to deal with marriages between its 
citizens and foreign nationals, marriages of its own citizens in foreign na-
tions, international adoptions, and a variety of other issues that require in-
ternational contacts of various sorts. 
The presumption that the subunits of a federal regime, but not a unitary 
regime, have authority to deal with external nations may seem somewhat 
unimportant, since, by its nature, that presumption could be counteracted by 
central government command. In fact, it would often make a real difference. 
To begin with, modern nations, and particularly democracies, have complex 
decision-making structures and procedures. The boundaries of a federalized 
subunit’s authority may not be clear, and in the absence of a crisis, might 
not be clarified for long periods of time. In addition, subunit governments 
                                                                                                                           
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). But see GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 10, at 205–20 (arguing 
that Holland was severely undermined by the Court’s decision in Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077 
(2014)). Maintaining a strong preemption doctrine for treaties does not run counter to the trend 
observed in Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (documenting the decline of the doctrine of foreign relations 
exceptionalism). Given that preemption remains an important feature of domestic law, it cannot be 
concluded that a nationalist approach to the issue in question is any less normal than a federalist 
approach. 
 141 See supra pp. 197–99. 
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tend to advocate for their autonomy, particularly in a federalized system, 
and may well be able to convince the central government to expand the 
scope of the uncertainty or prolong its duration. Third, as Robert Scott and 
Paul Stephan have observed, many international law agreements lend them-
selves to informal or contract-based enforcement, which would enable the 
subunit to establish and maintain a relationship with a foreign nation in the 
absence of the formal authority that the national government might pro-
vide.142 The result is that an external nation, receiving some sort of request 
for relations with a federalized subunit, or perceiving an opportunity to es-
tablish such relations, will often not know whether the subject nation’s cen-
tral government has authorized, tolerated, or prohibited those contacts. If it 
is entitled to presume that the contacts are permitted, it may well proceed in 
ways that would not be justified if it were dealing with subunits of a unitary 
regime, and this permissive period of uncertainty might persist for long pe-
riods of time. 
The presumption of authorized contact would also make a difference 
for the still more complex issue of the relationship between external nations 
and private firms or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the 
subject nation. It would mean that these actors would acquire a different 
status, vis-à-vis their central government, depending on their relationships 
with the governments of the federalized subunits.143 Of course, private firms 
and NGOs in democratic nations are generally free to establish international 
contacts of various kinds, but an authorization from a federalized subunit 
might make a considerable difference in conflictual situations. Consider, as 
an example, the Landless Workers’ Movement of Brazil (MST),144 an im-
portant social movement that has used direct action and political mobiliza-
tion to combat the plight of landless rural workers.145 International human 
                                                                                                                           
 142 ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY 
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148–51 (2006). As the authors state: “[A] 
relationship that has no clear end point and substantial value to all participants can rely on retalia-
tion to police compliance . . . . We would expect to see formal enforcement, therefore, only where 
the interactions of the parties are complex and lack transparency.” Id. at 149. Thus, an agreement 
for special trade relations or a cultural exchange between a national subunit and a foreign govern-
ment, which is relatively simple and clear in its implications, can be enforced by retaliation (if one 
party defaults, the other can withdraw) and thus not require formal state action. 
 143 This subject is discussed here because subtleties of this sort are much less likely to arise in 
situations where definitive intervention is either justified, as a matter of international law, or car-
ried out as a matter of realpolitik. 
 144 MST stands for the organization’s name in Portuguese, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Sem Terra. 
 145 See PETER P. HOUTZAGER, The Movement of the Landless (MST) and the Juridical Field 
in Brazil 1–2 (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 248, 2005). The MST is an organization 
of 1.5 million landless peasants from twenty-three of Brazil’s twenty-six states, but it is heavily 
represented in the impoverished Northeast. See RICHARD REYNOLDS, ON GUERILLA GARDENING: 
A HANDBOOK FOR GARDENING WITHOUT BOUNDARIES 36 (2008). In that region, the issue also 
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rights and environmental protection groups have expressed wide support for 
the MST’s goals. But the external response to which the Quebeçois are enti-
tled cannot be afforded to the MST unless the situation reached the point 
where intervention would be justified on the basis of humanitarian or hu-
man rights concerns. If the MST were able to obtain authority from one of 
Brazil’s twenty-six states, however, it would be in a stronger position to 
establish and maintain international contacts. Of course, the central gov-
ernment might forbid such contacts as a matter of national policy, but since 
the Workers’ Party has controlled that government under the da Silva and 
Rouseff administrations, relations between the MST and the central gov-
ernment have been complex and far from uniformly hostile. It might be dif-
ficult for that government to categorically forbid constructive international 
contacts by a social movement that had won the support of a federalized 
subunit of the nation. 
The role of federalism regarding the international contacts of subunits 
can be seen as analogous to its role in the context of forcible intervention, 
namely, that it functions as a solution rather than an independent justifica-
tion. In situations where forcible intervention is unjustified, a nation that 
received an invitation of some sort to establish economic or cultural rela-
tions with the subunit of another nation might not know whether it could 
properly respond. The basic principle is that it could do so if the national 
government approved the subunit’s action, but not if the national govern-
ment forbade it. As stated, however, the national government’s position 
might not be clear, and might be difficult or burdensome to determine in 
real situations. Federalism provides a solution, namely, that the foreign na-
tion is entitled to presume that the contact is permitted if it is dealing with a 
federalized subunit. The reason is that federalism, as discussed above, 
grants subunits of the nation autonomy to act in various capacities. A nation, 
by establishing itself as federal, is thus declaring that its subunits are au-
thorized to act on their own in a variety of situations. In a globalized envi-
ronment, that declaration is made throughout the world. 
CONCLUSION 
Should federalism make a difference in international relations? Should 
it serve as a basis for nations to pierce the sovereign veil that has been 
drawn around independent nations by the Westphalian system? International 
                                                                                                                           
has strong ecological ramifications because Northeastern peasants, rather than being given unused 
or lightly used land from the massive holdings of the wealthy, have been encouraged to clear un-
inhabited land in the adjoining Amazon rain forest. See Ken Conca, Environmental Protection, 
International Norms and State Sovereignty, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note 12, at 147, 157–58. 
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legal scholars, looking inward toward nation-states from a generalized and 
often normatively based perspective, have tended to ignore this question 
and treat nation-states as unitary sovereigns. American legal scholars, look-
ing outward from our vast and complex nation, have devoted a considerable 
amount of attention to the ability of its component states to maintain inter-
national contacts but have rarely gone beyond this domestic law problem to 
consider the international law questions of foreign intervention in a nation-
state’s affairs. This article attempts to remedy the resulting scholarly lacuna 
by asking whether federalism should play a role in international relations, 
whether it should alter the general rules by which one nation’s intervention 
in the affairs of another are judged. 
The answer is based on three general principles. First, federalism is a 
juridical grant of autonomy that is separate from the decentralization that 
occurs in all nations to a greater or lesser extent. Second, it is motivated and 
maintained by the separate political identity of the people in the subunit that 
has been granted this juridical autonomy. Third, it is not an independent 
right but a pragmatic strategy that can respond to the demands of some but 
far from all of the groups within a nation that might possess a separate polit-
ical identity. 
On the basis of these principles, this article concludes that a nation’s 
adoption or rejection of a federalized structure should not influence the de-
cisions of other nations about whether to intervene in its internal affairs. 
Those decisions should be based on the considerations that have already 
been extensively canvassed in international law, most notably humanitarian 
emergencies, ongoing human rights violations, and justifiable demands for 
self-determination. But interventions, being forceful actions that are sup-
ported by some norms and are opposed by others, should only be undertak-
en if they will do more good than harm—that is, if the intervener has some 
long-term strategy for solving the problem that induced its action. Federal-
ism, as a means of internal governance, can play an important and valuable 
role. As a compromise that acknowledges the separate political identity of 
geographically concentrated groups but enables the nation to continue func-
tioning as a coherent entity, it may well serve as a pragmatic, flexible solu-
tion to the presenting problem. As such, its availability renders certain in-
terventions more justifiable than they might be otherwise. In addition, it 
should be regarded as granting nations a presumptive right to establish con-
tacts with a subunit of the federalized nation in the absence of a clear indi-
cation from that nation’s government that such contacts are forbidden. 
  
 
